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CLASS ACTION MECHANISMS IN CHINESE AND 




This Article provides an overview of the class action mechanisms of China 
and Taiwan, including an analysis of the legal and court systems and other 
institutions involved in the implementation. By examining representative cases 
and empirical evidence, this Article marks transitions between the introduction 
of a class action mechanism and its later transition. 
There have been different approaches and attitudes toward class disputes 
in Chinese, Taiwanese, and Western legal systems due to the differences in 
governmental control and preferences for how such disputes should be solved. 
The melamine milk powder case is one of the best examples to illustrate the 
Chinese approach. This Article attempts to prove that there is another set of 
rules adopted by the Chinese government, which differs from those established 
by statute. On the other hand, Taiwan’s novel attempt to use government-
sanctioned organizations (“GSOs”) as class action initiators is also 
comparatively new to the world. Even though GSOs have litigating advantages 
conferred by law, the effectiveness of GSOs is still limited due to a lack of 
resources and incentives exacerbated by insufficient funding. While they may 
have deficiencies in regard to rules or design, new approaches stemming from 
these two jurisdictions suggest other possibilities of addressing class disputes 
not only for civil law countries but also for common law countries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Class actions originated from Anglo-American equity practice.1 However, 
with the increase in collective disputes and mass torts in modern, industrialized 
China and Taiwan, these two jurisdictions have adopted class action 
mechanisms to deal with the pressing need for class dispute resolution. Due to 
China’s status as one of the greatest economic entities in the world, its political 
and legal system has been a focal point for scholars of comparative law and 
politics. On the other hand, Taiwan, with its complicated political history with 
China and distinct democratic government, is an excellent comparator for how 
class action mechanisms function in a civil law country with a different 
political system. Studying the class action mechanisms of China and Taiwan 
provides an illustrative example of how different civil law states implement 
class action mechanisms, but commentators may question whether traditional 
civil law theories are suitable foundations for newly evolved class disputes. 
While the United States has been well-known for its numerous class action 
lawsuits associated with huge punitive damages,2 different approaches have 
been applied in both China and Taiwan due to various factors. 
This Article will first introduce representative cases in each jurisdiction, 
followed by a discussion of their respective class action mechanisms, including 
the legal system and other institutions involved in their implementation, from 
both substantive and procedural perspectives. Second, the actual practices and 
transitions of class action mechanisms will be reviewed, as well as their 
implications. By comparing cases in these jurisdictions, this Article aims to 
probe into the rationale behind differences and convergences in the general 
practice of class action mechanisms. 
I. CHINA 
China is one of the few jurisdictions to embrace class action mechanisms 
outside of the United States. 3  By incorporating Article 55 into its Civil 
Procedure Law (“CPL”) and stipulating the judicial procedures for class 
actions, China formally adopted a class action mechanism in 1991.4 There have 
 
 1 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832–33 (1999). 
 2 See generally Francis E. McGovern, Punitive Damages and Class Actions, 70 LA. L. REV. 435 (2010). 
 3 Shai Oster, Major Lawsuit Won by Workers in Zhejiang, CHINA LAB. BULL. (July 9, 2001), http:// 
www.china-labour.org.hk/en/node/2968. 
 4 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, art. 55), reprinted in THE 
CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW AND COURT RULES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 54 (Wei Luo ed., 2006) 
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been both Chinese and international scholarly works concerning the class 
action mechanism and its implementation in China.5 However, due to the lack 
of both overall statistical data and transparency in empirical information about 
the operation of the legal system, most of the literature has only analyzed this 
issue through the scattered cases that are available. 6  This situation has 
presented difficulties in drawing a clear overview of the real practice of class 
actions mechanisms in China. 
An unexpected nationwide tainted milk case after the Beijing Olympics in 
2008 offered the best objective test of how class action mechanisms function in 
China. This case drew the world’s attention because a number of infants died 
or became ill after consuming the products manufactured by the largest 
corporate milk powder group in China.7  Because the tragedy involved the 
health of their beloved babies, angry parents pursued every means available to 
fight for their children.8  Combining the tainted milk case with other class 
disputes, this Article discusses whether the tainted milk scandal was an 
exceptional Chinese case or whether it actually reflects the common practice of 
the class action mechanism in China. 
 
(“Where the subject matters of an action is under the same category and one of the parties has numerous 
litigants but the exact number of the litigants is uncertain when the lawsuit is filed, the people’s court may 
issue a public notice to explain the nature of the case and he claims of the litigation and informing those 
interested persons who are entitled to the claim to register their rights with the people’s court within a fixed 
period of time.”). There were two amendments to the CPL in 2007 and 2012; the article number was changed 
to 54 in 2012. See Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/ 
wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6033 (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). For the purpose of precision, this Article refers to 
the version and CPL article number that each case applied or should have applied. However, the article number 
for the current version will be provided at the end of the footnote if it is not the most recent.  
 5 See generally Feng Chen & Xin Xu, “Active Judiciary”: Judicial Dismantling of Workers’ Collective 
Action in China, 67 CHINA J. 88 (2012); Note, Class Action Litigation in China, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1523 
(1998). 
 6 See, e.g., Class Action Litigation in China, supra note 5, at 1523–24. 
 7 Chinese Brand Sanlu, Tainted by Milk Scandal, Brings 7.3 Mln Yuan at Auction, XINHUA: WINDOW OF 
CHINA (May 12, 2009, 6:49 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-05/12/content_11360451.htm. 
 8 See Fang Yang, China Court Accepts First Lawsuit over Melamine Tainted Milk, XINHUA: WINDOW 
OF CHINA (Mar. 25, 2009, 7:48 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/25/content_11072195.htm. 
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A. Tainted Milk Case 
1. Overview 
A five-month-old Chinese baby died after suffering from kidney failure 
caused by contaminated milk. 9  He was believed to be the first casualty 
associated with consuming formula tainted with the industrial chemical 
melamine.10 In Guizhou Province, a mother said that her eighteen month-old 
baby was diagnosed as having double kidney stones.11 The doctor simply told 
her that the baby “should drink more water.”12 However, at the time of her 
interview, her baby was still sick.13 These two babies both consumed milk 
powder from the Sanlu Group in China.14 Before the melamine scandal broke 
out in September 2008, Sanlu had been a leading company in China’s milk 
powder industry.15 
The tainted milk powder caused six deaths, and 300,000 children 
contracted diseases, including kidney stones and kidney failure.16 Sanlu and 
twenty-one other dairy companies contributed one million yuan 17  to a 
compensation fund by borrowing 902 million yuan. 18  The fund offered 
200,000 yuan to families whose children died and 30,000 yuan for serious 
illnesses such as kidney stones and acute kidney failure; 2,000 yuan was 
offered for victims in less severe cases.19 Another 200 million yuan went to a 
foundation intended to cover the future medical expenses of victims. 20 
 
 9 Wang Guanqun, Parents of Dead Child Accept Compensation After China Tainted Milk Scandal, 
XINHUA: WINDOW OF CHINA (Jan. 16, 2009, 1:18 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/16/ 
content_10668505.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2014).  
 10 Id. 
 11 Liu Chin-tu & Lin Ying, Parents of Tainted Milk Victims Refuse Compensation, HK MING BAO [HK 
NEWSPAPER], (Jan. 26, 2009), available at World News Connection.  
 12 Id.  
 13 Id.  
 14 Id.  
 15 Chinese Brand Sanlu, Tainted by Milk Scandal, Brings 7.3 Mln Yuan at Auction, supra note 7. 
 16 Id.; Guanqun, supra note 9. 
 17 At the time of this writing, the average exchange rate was 6.1 yuan to 1 USD. See Official Exchange 
Rate (LCU per US$ Period Average), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/PA.NUS.FCRF (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2013) for continually updated data on official exchange rates. 
 18 Sun Yunlong, Chinese Court to Sentence 21 Defendants over Tainted Milk Powder Scandal, XINHUA: 
WINDOW OF CHINA (Jan. 22, 2009, 9:24 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/22/content_ 
10700333.htm.  
 19 Yang, supra note 8. 
 20 See Lan Xinzhen, Questioning Compensation: Transparent Management and Open Information 
Needed for the Fund Set Up to Compensate Victims of the 2008 Sanlu Milk Scandal, XINHUA: WINDOW OF 
CHINA (June 27, 2011), http://www.bjreview.com.cn/health/txt/2011-06/27/content_371892.htm#. 
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According to the China Dairy Industry Association, around ninety percent of 
the victims’ families have accepted this arrangement and been compensated.21 
This includes the families of six dead children and 891 other infants who 
became seriously ill. 22  Because of the tainted milk scandal, Sanlu filed a 
bankruptcy petition in the face of a 1.1 billion yuan debt in September 2008,23 
which was accepted by the bankruptcy court in December 2008.24 In March 
2009, Sanlu was declared insolvent.25 
2. Legal and Political Efforts to Seek Justice 
For such a serious food safety and product liability case, why was there no 
initial lawsuit? In fact, cases were filed by the parents, but they were not 
accepted by the court until March 2009.26 Soon after the scandal broke out in 
September 2008, parents in Guangdong Province filed a lawsuit against Sanlu 
and the China Dairy Industry Association with the Guangzhou Intermediate 
People’s Court.27 Also, the father of the first child who died after drinking 
tainted formula sued Sanlu in a Gansu court.28 However, neither of the cases 
were accepted. Court officials declared, “too many children were affected 
nationwide in the scandal. Conditions were not ripe to accept the cases. We 
need more time to think it over.”29 
Some lawyers organized a group providing pro bono services for the 
families of infants who consumed Sanlu’s products.30 At one time, the group 
contained 124 lawyers from twenty-two provinces.31 They primarily offered 
legal counseling for the victimized families and passed messages between the 
families and the government.32 However, some lawyers indicated that several 
 
 21 China Dairy Association: 90% of Tainted Milk Victims Compensated, XINHUA: WINDOW OF CHINA 
(Jan. 24, 2009, 12:50 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/24/content_10710906.htm. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Sun, supra note 18. 
 24 Court Says China Firm in Milk Scare Files for Bankruptcy, BAY LEDGER NEWS ZONE (Dec. 23, 2008, 
7:00 PM), http://www.blnz.com/news/2008/12/24/Court_says_China_firm_milk_5853.html. 
 25 See Yang, supra note 8. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Wang, supra note 9. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id.  
 30 Xie Chuanjiao, First Suit Filed Against Sanlu, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 7, 2008, 7:40AM), http://www. 
chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2008-10/07/content_7081446.htm.  
 31 Id.  
 32 Id. 
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officials from the judicial department pressured them to leave the pro bono 
service group.33 
Five parents of children sickened by the tainted milk even attempted to 
hold a press conference in January 2009, but were detained by the Chinese 
police to prevent them from doing so.34 Several representatives of the victims’ 
parents submitted a joint complaint letter signed by more than 600 parents to 
the Ministry of Health, the State Letters and Complaints Bureau, the China 
Dairy Products Association, and the China Consumer Council in the same 
month. 35  They expressed their refusal of the compensation proposal, 
demanding that authorities enhance scientific research on melamine and 
continue monitoring the health of the victims suffering from kidney stones.36 
The parents’ representatives said that they would not take further action during 
the Chinese New Year, but hoped that the relevant government department 
would appropriately handle the parents’ complaint.37 
Some parents were reluctant to accept the compensation package at the 
beginning, but have since been persuaded and changed their minds.38 If they 
accepted, they were entitled to free medical treatment but had to give up suing 
Sanlu.39 A lawyer working for a couple whose child was affected said that 
“legal procedures are too complicated for them, which made them decide to 
take the money.” 40  The head of the Commercial Law Institute at Renmin 
University of China also commented that accepting compensation was a 
 
 33 Chris Buckley, China Milk Victim Lawyers Say Pressed to Quit, REUTERS (Sept. 28, 2008, 5:02 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/28/us-china-milk-law-idUSTRE48R0ZK20080928?sp=true; Hebei jin 
luishi zhu shouhaizhe suo chang, Beijing zu dunaifen baodao [Hebei Authorities Refrain Lawyers from 
Assisting Victim for Seeking Compensation; Beijing Authorities Blocked the News of Tainted Milk Powder], 
BOXUN (citing PINGGUUO RIBAO [APPLE DAILY]), Sept. 24, 2008, http://boxun.com/news/gb/china/2008/09/ 
200809241208.shtml (last visited Sept. 12, 2013). 
 34 See Parents of China Milk Scandal Victims Detained, REUTERS (Jan. 2, 2009, 5:59 PM), http://in. 
reuters.com/article/2009/01/02/idINIndia-37259720090102. China releases parents of melamine children: 
lawyer, AFP, Jan. 2, 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iFjHMZI9ZyNyTKY_-Qg 
FNpwB0PPA?hl=en (last visited Sept. 12, 2013); Dunai shouhai jiashu beikouliu huohuoshi [The Victimized 
Family Members Detained Were Released], SINCHEW WAN [SINCHEW NET] (Jan. 3, 2009), http://news. 
sinchew.com.my/topic/node/66757 (last visited Sept. 12, 2013).  
 35 Liu & Lin, supra note 11.  
 36 Id.  
 37 Id.  
 38 Wang, supra note 9. 
 39 Id. Ng Tze-wei, Pain Lingers from Melamine-Tainted Milk Scandal, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 
6, 2009, http://www.scmp.com/article/691689/pain-lingers-melamine-tainted-milk-scandal (last visited Sept. 
10, 2013). 
 40 Wang, supra note 9. 
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practical option for parents because it enabled quick payment to victims and 
avoided the high costs of legal procedures.41 
After the work to compensate children suffering from melamine-tainted 
Sanlu milk powder had concluded in March 2009,42 Hebei Province finally 
accepted the first compensation lawsuit.43 At the time of the report, only five 
cases were remaining that were accepted by the court. 44  Also, in late 
November 2009, the Shijiazhuang Intermediate Court ruled that the bankruptcy 
proceeding had ended.45 This means that even if the families win the lawsuits, 
they will not obtain any compensation from Sanlu.46 
B. The Class Action Mechanism in China 
1. The Governing Law and Relevant Interpretations of Class Action in 
China 
Article 55 of the CPL provides the legal basis for Chinese class actions. It 
stipulates that when a case has numerous litigants, and the subject matter of an 
action is under the same category, the court may issue a public notice for 
interested persons to register their rights with the People’s Court.47 Before a 
case can qualify as a class action, it must be filed in conformity with the 
provisions of Article 108 of the CPL, which specifies the general requirements 
for filing a case. 48  When a People’s Court receives a written motion of 
 
 41 Id. 
 42 Compensation Work for China’s Tainted Milk Victims Concluded, XINHUA: WINDOW OF CHINA, 
(March 2, 2009), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/02/content_10930243.htm. 
 43 China Court Accepts First Lawsuit over Melamine Tainted Milk, XINHUA: WINDOW OF CHINA (Mar. 
25, 2009), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/25/content_11072195.htm.  
 44 Chang Yi Li, Salu Pochan Huaner Huopeiwuwang Baiyu Lushi Zu Tuan Yuanzhu [Sanlu Victimized 
Infants Have no Hope in Obtaining Compensation, More Than 100 Lawyers Will to Assistance], NFDAILY.CN 
(Dec. 3, 2009), http://china.nfdaily.cn/content/2009-12/03/content_6751774.htm. 
 45 Sanlu Pochanchengxu Zhongjie, Jinghou Jiang Buzai Peichang Huanzhe [Sanlu’s Bankruptcy 
Proceeding Ended. Sanlu Will Not Compensate the Victims Thereafter], SINA (Nov. 30, 2009), http://news. 
sina.com/102-101-101-101/2009-11-30/0103631168.html.  
 46 Id. 
 47 See Civil Procedure Law, art. 55 (1991) (China). 
 48 The following conditions must be met before a lawsuit is filed: (1) The plaintiff must be a citizen, legal 
person, or an organization having a direct interest with the case. (2) There must be a specific defendant. (3) There 
must be a concrete claim, a factual basis, and a cause for the lawsuit. (4) The lawsuit must be within the scope of 
civil lawsuits to be accepted by the People’s Courts and within the jurisdiction of the People’s Court to which the 
lawsuit is filed.”Id. art. 119;“A motion of complaint shall clearly state the following items: (1) The name, sex, age, 
ethnicity, occupation, working unit, and address of parties or, if the parties are legal persons or organizations, their 
names and addresses and the names and positions of their legal representatives or principal leading personnel; (2) 
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complaint or an oral complaint that meets the requirements of a civil lawsuit, 
the court shall accept the case within seven days and notify the parties 
involved.49 If the complaint does not meet the requirements, the court shall 
make a ruling to reject the complaint within seven days.50 The rules for judicial 
mediation are also stipulated in the CPL, in which a mediation agreement must 
be based on consent of both parties without compulsion.51 
In the Tainted Milk Case, the victims’ parents, on behalf of their children, 
did try to assert their rights under the law.52 Some anxious parents even tried to 
file compensation claims individually.53 However, none of these attempts were 
accepted by the courts or the government.54 Instead, China adopted a different 
approach to handle this mass dispute. The authorities first rejected any form of 
lawsuits.55 After coming up with a compensation plan, they persuaded most of 
the victims to accept the settlement.56 It was not until seven months after the 
tainted milk case broke out that the courts accepted the first lawsuit.57 It may 
not be surprising that gaps exist between the law and real practice in China,58 
and the extensive influence of the tainted milk case could be an excuse for the 
Chinese government to reject claimants utilizing a class action mechanism. 
However, if most other class disputes have actually followed a similar pattern, 
it implies that there might be some hurdles in applying class action 
mechanisms in the Chinese context, or even raises the question of whether the 
class action mechanism is compatible with the Chinese legal system. 
 
The claims of the lawsuit and the facts and grounds on which the lawsuit is based; and (3) Evidence and its source, 
as well as the names and addresses of witnesses.”Id. art. 121. 
 49 “When a people’s court receives a motion of complaint or an oral complaint and finds the complaint 
meets the requirements of a civil lawsuit after reviewing the complaint, the court shall accept the case within 
seven days and notify the parties involved; if the complaint does not meet the requirements of a civil lawsuit, 
the court shall, within seven days, make a ruling to reject the complaint. If the plaintiff does not agree with the 
ruling, he may appeal on the ruling.” Id. art. 123. 
 50 Id. 
 51 A “mediation agreement must be based on voluntariness of both parties, and shall not be reached 
through compulsion. The content of the mediation agreement may not contravene the law.” Id. art. 96. 
 52 Wang, supra note 9. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58  Traci Daffer, I Am Fighting for the Right to Eat, and I Will Keep Fighting. The Truth Is on Our Side”: 
Class Action Litigation as a Means of Enacting Social Change in China, 75 UMKC L.REV. 227(2006) (citing 
Wenhai Cai, Private Securities Litigation in China: Of Prominence and Problems, 13 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 135, 
150 (1999)). 
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C. Early Cases 
Before the class action mechanism was officially implemented in China, 
there were several class disputes addressed in an approach similar to class 
actions. 59  The reason for adopting the class action-like approach was the 
government’s attention after such cases were publicized and the need to handle 
them as soon as possible.60 One of the most representative cases was about 
farmers suing the local seeds company in Sichuan for breach of contracts in 
1983. 
The 1569 rice-seed farmers, represented by eight farmers, sued the seeds 
company of Anyue in Sichuan for breach of seeds contracts and its unlawful 
change of the purchase price of seeds via administrative decree on behalf of the 
county government.61 Mass publicity by the media drew the attention of both 
the central and the local governments.62 Even though China’s civil procedure 
law did not allow for such group suits at that time due to fear of unrest, the 
government supported local courts in handling the cases efficiently by trying 
them together rather than individually.63 The case was eventually resolved via 
the court’s mediation, with farmers being awarded with compensation.64 In the 
following years, the courts across the nation continued to hear some class 
dispute cases.65 Some cases even involved local governments bringing suits on 
behalf of the harmed parties.66 These experiences, coupled with academics’ 
advocacy, resulted in China formally incorporating class-action suits in the 
CPL in 1991. 
 
 59 Xue Yonghui, Qunti jiufen yu qunti susong yanjiu [Research on Group Disputes and Group Actions] 
197 (2009).  
 60 Id. 
 61 Anlexian Yuanbaxiang Nulixiang Yiqian Wu Bai Liushijiu Hu Daozhong Jingyinghu Yu Anlexian 
Zhong Zi Gongsi Shuidao Zhizhong Gouxiao Hetong Jiufen An [Case of Dispute over Contract of Sale of Rice 
Seeds Between 1569 Rice-seeds Growing Farmers in the Villages of Yuanba and Nule, Anyue County and the 
Seeds Company of Anyue County] (Anyue Cnty. People’s Ct. 1985) (China Law Info).  
 62 Xue, supra note 59, at 198. 
 63 See id. 
 64 Anlexian Yuanbaxiang Nulixiang Yiqian Wu Bai Liushijiu Hu Daozhong Jingyinghu Yu Anlexian 
Zhong Zi Gongsi Shuidao Zhizhong Gouxiao Hetong Jiufen An, supra note 61. 
 65 Xue, supra note 59, at 198. 
 66 Class Action Litigation in China, supra note 5, at 1526 n.21. 
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D. Recent Cases 
After the 1990s, class disputes increased in number67 and complexity.68 
Courts in different areas have different concentrations of class disputes. For 
example, the Haiko Intermediate Court has heard class action cases related to 
securities, real estate, eminent domain, labor disputes, and tour services.69 On 
the other hand, the cases filed with Hebei courts have mostly been about rural 
land contracting, eminent domain, rural collective economy distribution, labor 
disputes, and environmental cases. 70  Most of the cases introduced in this 
Article qualified as class action suits in theory. However, many of them were 
eventually rejected by the courts, settled, or mediated before any class action 
procedures were applied. In some situations, the claimants were asked to file 
claims separately. At most, some fortunate cases may have been considered as 
joinder claims, but still, they have not been treated as class action suits. 
E. Mass Tort Class Action Cases 
Besides the tainted milk cases, there have been some mass tort cases in 
China that are qualified as class actions and could have utilized class action 
mechanisms. For example, 1721 residents in Xiping, Fujian Province, sued a 
chemical factory for pollution.71 The courts did not accept the case as a class 
action, but as a joinder claim.72 Through the support of the Center for Legal 
Assistance to Pollution Victims, the residents won the preliminary case against 
the chemical factory, in which the court only ruled that the defendants should 
cease from polluting but did not address the compensation issue.73 Another 
case involved 120 patients in Guangzhou suing a hospital for malpractice by its 
medical professionals.74 This case was also accepted as a joinder claim and not 
as a class action case.75 The lawsuit is allegedly under hearing,76 but no further 
information is available as of this writing. 
 
 67 See id. at 1531. 
 68 See Xue, supra note 59, at 166. 
 69 Id. at 151. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See Shai Oster & Mei Fong, In Booming China, a Doctor Battles a Polluting Factory, PULITZER (June 
19, 2006), http://www.pulitzer.org/archives/7144; see also Li Yucheng, Li Yun: In Order to Clear Streams and 
Protests in Media, HK (Mar. 3, 2008), http://www.inmediahk.net/node/100131. 
 72 Oster & Fong, supra note 71. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Guangdongshen Gongbu Duochi Wuran Xiaofezhe Shijian [Toxic Consumer Release More Pollution 
in Guangdong Province], XINHUA: WINDOW OF CHINA (Mar. 13, 2001), http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/ 
huanbao/56/20010313/416248.html. 
 75 Id. 
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F. Securities Class Disputes 
Securities class disputes are often addressed in a special law regime in 
many countries in the world. China is no exception. The Chinese government 
has paid extra attention to this area because the nature of the cases usually 
involves a large number of investors and often relates to foreign investments. 
The Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) has issued several notices or provisions 
instructing lower courts on how to handle this type of case. These instructions 
provide another example of China’s attitude toward solving consumer class 
disputes and how it addresses this type of issue. 
In 2001, for the first time, the SPC addressed the issue of securities 
disputes.77 The SPC not only recognized that many problems, such as insider 
trading and frauds, have emerged in China’s developing capital market, but 
also admitted that limitations in legislative and judicial conditions have made it 
inappropriate to accept or to try relevant cases.78 Therefore, the Notice of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Refusing to Accept Civil Compensation Cases 
Involving Securities for the Time Being (“RAC”) specified that civil 
compensation cases caused by the acts mentioned above shall be denied 
temporarily.79 The stated reason was that safe and healthy development of the 
capital market should be normalized step by step.80 
This situation did not change until the SPC issued another notice in 2002—
the Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on the Relevant Issues concerning 
the Acceptance of Cases of Disputes over Civil Tort Arising from False 
 
 76 Id.  
 77 Michael Palmer & Chao Xi, China, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 270, 275 (2009). 
 78 The capital market of our country has been in the phase of normalization and development and 
many problems have emerged, such as insider trading, frauds, rigging the market and other acts. 
These acts have damaged the fairness of the securities exchanges, infringed upon the legal rights 
and interests of the investors, affected the safe and healthy development of the capital market, 
and shall be normalized step by step. At the present, these new situations and new problems that 
deserve attention and study have emerged in the courtroom, but due to the limitation of the 
legislative and judicial conditions of the present time, it is not high time to accept and try this 
kind of cases. So it is decided after deliberation, the civil compensation cases caused by the acts 
mentioned above shall be denied temporarily.  
Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Refusing to Accept Civil Compensation Cases 
Involving Securities for the Time Being (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, Sept. 21, 
2001) [hereinafter RAC]. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
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Statement in the Securities Market (“RIA”).81 The notice allowed initiating a 
securities fraud case only when the cases have been investigated by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission. 82  The RIA also clearly prohibited the 
initiation of class actions,83 and specified that Intermediate People’s Courts 
shall report to the SPC whenever they accept this type of case as a single or 
joint lawsuit.84 
In 2003, the SPC promulgated another Provision—Some Provisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Trying Cases of Civil Compensation Arising from 
False Statement in Securities Market (“FSS”). 85  Instead of loosening the 
restriction on the class actions, FSS now clearly stipulates that plaintiffs may 
file separate lawsuits or joinder claims,86 and “the number of plaintiffs in a 
joint lawsuit shall be determined before the hearing.”87 If the claims under the 
same factual basis have been filed separately, the courts can either inform the 
plaintiff who has filed an individual claim to participate in the joinder claim, or 
combine these separate claims into one joinder claim.88 In short, the class 
action mechanism is still inhibited in securities fraud cases, since the most 
significant feature of the Chinese class action mechanism, the function of 
public notice by the court, was seized. The current practice reflects the fact that 
courts do not accept securities fraud cases as class actions due to the concern 
 
 81 Disputes over Civil Tort Arising from False Statement in the Securities Market (promulgated by the 
Supreme People’s Court, Jan. 15, 2002) (“In a case of civil compensation arising from false statement, which 
is accepted by the people’s court, the false statement must have been investigated by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission or its dispatched office, and an effective penalty decision shall have been made by it. 
Only when the party concerned files a civil lawsuit by deeming the investigation result as the factual basis may 
the people’s court accept this case in accordance with the law . . . .”) [hereinafter RIA].  
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. (“With respect to a case of civil compensation arising from false statement, the people’s court shall 
accept it in the form of a single or joint lawsuit, not in the form of class action.”) 
 84 Id. art. 6 (“A relevant intermediate People’s Court shall, within 3 days after receipt of such a case, 
report the information on the acceptance level by level to the Supreme People’s Court.”).  
 85 Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Trying Cases of Civil Compensation Arising from 
False Statement in Securities Market, SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. (Feb. 1, 2003). 
 86 Id. art 13 (“Where more than one plaintiff bring lawsuits regarding the same false statement and 
against the same defendant, and there are separate lawsuit(s) and joint lawsuit, the People’s Court may notify 
the plaintiffs bringing separate lawsuit(s) to participate in the joint lawsuit. Where more than one plaintiff 
bring two or more joint lawsuits regarding the same false statement and against the same defendant, the 
People’s Court may combine them into one joint lawsuit.”). 
 87 Id. art. 14 (“The number of plaintiffs in a joint lawsuit shall be determined before the opening of the 
court. If the number of plaintiffs is large, two to five litigation representatives may be selected, and each 
litigation representative may entrust one or two agents ad litem.”).  
 88 Id. arts. 13–14.  
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that that the Chinese court system is not yet well developed to handle such 
large mass disputes.89  
The largest case in terms of the number of the plaintiffs and the claim 
amount was the Dongfang Electronics Corporation case filed with the Qingdao 
Intermediate People’s Court in 2004.90 This case involved 6989 investors, with 
a claim amount of 4.42 million yuan.91 Most of the investors settled via judicial 
mediation.92 The vice president of the SPC praised the Qingdao Intermediate 
Court’s work: “This case involved nearly 7000 investors and [a] large amount 
of claims. The Qingdao Intermediate Court did a good job to end this case by 
judicial mediation. . . . This will not only protect the investors’ interests, but 
will also ensure the stability and development of the state-owned company.”93  
G. Consumer Class Actions 
For consumer class disputes, in contrast to mass tort cases, it may not be 
economically rational to file a claim in which the expenses will exceed the 
recoverable compensation, except via class action mechanisms. However, a 
case that likely involves a large number of potential plaintiffs, with political or 
social sensitivity, is usually difficult to initiate as a class action suit, since it 
may go beyond the court’s control. 94  The two cases filed against China 
Telecom95 and other telecommunication companies provide the best examples 
of the class action mechanism applying. The first case was filed by Qinghua 
University students against China Telecom, Beijing Telecom, and Hubei 
Telecom in 1997 for twenty-three days of service disconnection without any 
advance notice. The twenty-two students, with the aid of the Beijing University 
 
 89 RAC, supra note 78. 
 90 Gufenyouxiangongsi zhongda susong shijian jingzhan gonggao [The Important Public Notice of 
Litigations], YanTai Dongfang DianZiXinXiChanYe [Dongfang Electronics Corporation] (May 21, 2009), 
http://www.cninfo.com.cn/finalpage/2009-05-26/52849572.PDF [hereinafter Dongfang Elec. Corp. Public 
Notice of Litigation]. 
 91 Id 
 92 Id.  
 93 Zuigaofayuan fuyuanzhang Xi Xiao Ming dui Qingdao zhong yuan gong zuo zuo chu pi shi [The 
Deputy of SPC Commented on Qingdao Intermediate Court’s Work], QINGDAO FAYUAN WANG, May 22, 
2009, http://qdfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=1651 (last visited Sept. 5, 2013). 
 94 Xue Yonghui, Qunti jiufen yu qunti susong yanjiu [Research on Group Disputes and Group Actions] 
227 (2009). 
 95 About Us, CHINA TELECOM, http://en.chinatelecom.com.cn/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2013) (“China 
Telecommunications Corporation (China Telecom) is an extra-large State-owned telecom operator in China, 
Global Partner of World Expo 2010 Shanghai, and was selected into the Top 500 Global Corporations for 
many consecutive years. China Telecom mainly provides the integrated information services including the 
fixed-line telephone, mobile service, Internet connection and applications services.”).  
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pro bono legal service, filed the claim against the defendants.96 The Beijing 
West District Court accepted the case under Article 55 of the CPL.97 One of 
the claims raised by the plaintiffs was that the court should issue a public 
notice for potential plaintiffs to join the suit, so that the future judgment could 
be binding on those who register their rights with the court.98 The defendants 
argued that: (1) this case should not apply the class action mechanism and it 
would be difficult to confirm the identity of each claimant who wished to 
register his or her right and to join the lawsuit;99 and (2) using the class action 
mechanism in this case would cause chaos and impair social stability.100 The 
court conducted a judicial mediation, but no consensus was reached by the 
parties.101 Thereafter, for over a year, the court postponed and did not hear the 
case for unknown reasons. Eventually, in April 1999, the final hearing ended 
with the defendants presenting their final argument: “China Telecom is the 
enterprise of the Chinese people.”102 The court neither addressed the plaintiffs’ 
claim about issuing a notice for potential plaintiffs to join the lawsuit, nor did it 
respond to this issue in any form.103 
The second case was filed by eighty-five consumers against China Telecom 
for the voidance of phone cards.104 The Beijing First Intermediate People’s 
Court rejected this case as a class action based on the large number of 
plaintiffs, and the potential for every claim to involve different facts.105 The 
court indicated that it would be difficult to determine the facts of every claim 
 
 96 Wu Fei, Cong Qinghua 200 ka anjian kan Zhongguo jituan su song [Viewing Chinese Class Actions 
From the Qinghua 200 Card Case], 73 FASHANG YANJIOU (LAW & COMMERCE RESEARCH) (1999).  
 97 Id. The plaintiffs claimed that: (1) The defendants should guarantee their phone cards would function 
in all cities, and no more similar incidents would occur thereafter; (2) the defendants should explain to the 
consumers the reasons for this disconnection and apologize to the consumers for this error; (3) the defendants 
should reimburse plaintiffs for costs and expenses; and (4) the court should issue a public notice to let other 
potential plaintiffs register and join this class action so that the judgment of this case could apply to those who 
register their rights with the court. Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Wang Xiu Quan & Liu Wan Yong, Qinghua xuesheng su Zhongguodianxin an 21 ri kaiting [The 
Hearing of Qinghua Students Suing China Telecom Case on 21], BBS SHUI MU QING HUA ZHAN [Qinghua 
University Bulletin Board System] (Apr. 23, 1999), http://www.newsmth.net/bbsanc.php?path=%2Fgroups% 
2Fliteral.faq%2FLaw%2Fold%2Fcase%2Fxsqszgdx%2Fdianxin.  
 103 See Wu Fei, supra note 96. 
 104 Jituan susong zeng zhi 301 ren fayuan wei he bu shou li ci ka susong [The Number of Claimants in the 
Phone-Card Class Action Has Gone to 301; Why the Court Did Not Accept the Case], ZHONG HUA WANG 
[ZHONG HUA NET] (Aug. 15, 2001, 9:25 AM), http://news.china.com/zh_cn/domestic/945/20010815/ 
10080261.html. 
 105 Id. 
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and hear the case on a timely basis.106 Also, additional claims could be raised 
that would further complicate the case.107 Therefore, the court held that this 
type of case should be divided and filed separately.108 The plaintiffs appealed 
the Intermediate People’s Court decision to the Beijing High People’s Court.109 
Interestingly, while waiting for the Beijing High People’s Court’s decision, 
some of the plaintiffs decided to file separate claims with the Beijing West 
District Court.110 The attorney for the plaintiffs said, “We adopted this strategy 
because we’ve learned from repeated failures. By filing the cases separately, 
the court would have no reason to reject us again.”111 He also noted, “Dividing 
a case under the same factual basis and filing the suits separately with the 
courts will increase the court’s work load by 200 times [many times]. 
However, we are still happy to do so, because this is the only way to protect 
the plaintiffs’ rights according to the court’s reasoning in rejecting class 
actions.”112 
At first, the Beijing High People’s Court rejected the plaintiffs’ appeal.113 
However, due to pressure from media and the general public, after consulting 
with China Telecom, the High People’s Court ruled that the Intermediate 
People’s Court should not accept this case as a class action case.114 With no 
agreement reached in the mediation, 115  the court ruled in favor of the 
defendant,116 and the eighty-five plaintiffs represented by Qing Tin, who had 
bought 4,660,000 yuan worth of phone cards, should bear the court fees.117 
 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Cika yonghu shi zhan dao di Zhongguodianxin jiang bei gao ji bai hui [Consumers Determined to 
Continue Fight For Their Rights; China Telecom Will Be Sued Hundreds of Times], HE XUN WANG (Sept. 
6, 2001, 10:59 AM), http://www.liaohai.com.cn/liaohai/chinese/04/show.asp?t=219. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id.  
 113 Cika yonghu zhuang gao Zhongguodianxin Gaoyuan zhong cai bu yu shouli [Phone Card Users Sued 
China Telecom; the High Court Rejected the Appeal], ZHONG HUA WANG (Oct. 8, 2001, 5:00 PM), 
http://tech.china.com/zh_cn/news/tel/896/20011008/10121778.html. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Ma Dao, Dianhua cika yonghu zhuang gao Zhongguodianxin Fayuan diaojie shibai [Phone Card 
Users Sued China Telecom; The Judicial Mediation Failed], XINHUA: WINDOW OF CHINA (Mar. 21, 2002, 
8:09 AM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/it/2002-03/21/content_325354.htm.  
 116 Li Xu & Niu Ai Min, Zhongguo cika dianhua yonghu zhuang gao Zhongguodianxin baisu [The 
Plaintiff Who Bought 466 Wan Yuan Phone Card Sued China Telecom and Lost], XINHUA: WINDOW OF CHINA 
(March 29, 2002, 6:20 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2002-03/29/content_337151.htm. 
 117 Id. 
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Another example was the case about the highway users suing the Northeast 
Expressway Corporation Heilongjiang Subsidiary for poor road conditions on 
the Hada Expressway (“Expressway”) and the unauthorized collection of toll 
fees.118 The attorney representing the highway users said that they filed the 
claim of 172 plaintiffs joining the lawsuit in August 2007. 119  This case 
involved the rights of millions of highway users who use the Expressway.120 
However, according to the representative attorney, this case was not heard until 
ten months after filing, resulting in most plaintiffs giving up and withdrawing 
their claims.121 Only thirty-eight plaintiffs remained in the lawsuit, and thirty 
of them were lawyers. 122  The publicity generated by this case drew the 
attention of Gai Ruyin, who served as the standing committee member of 
Heilongjiang Province and the secretary of the Daqing City Committee.123 In a 
press conference held in May 2008, the vice president of the transportation 
department indicated that the Expressway was important infrastructure, and 
Gai Ruyin demanded that Expressway construction should be completed as 
soon as possible with guaranteed quality.124 Eventually, both parties signed a 
settlement agreement through the mediation held by the Songbei Court.125 
Many other cases similar to the aforementioned ones126 encountered court 
rejection for the reason of unsuitability for hearing as class actions.127 The 
 
 118 Zhiyi shoufeiquan 172 ming shiyongzhe zhuang gao Hadagaosu guanlizhe [Questioning the 
Unauthorized Collection of Toll Fee, 172 Highway Users Sued the Business That Managed Hada 
Expressway], ZHONG GUO FA YUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB] (Sept. 3, 2007, 9:17 AM), http://www. 
chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=262742&k_title=哈大高速&k_content=哈大高速&k_author= Sep 3, 
2007. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Wang Song Yan, Hadagaosu an susonglushi: Gai an guan hu bai wan xiaofeizhe quanyi [The Attorney 
of Hada Expressway Case: This Is a Case Involving The Benefit of Millions of Users], DONGBEI WANG—
HEILONGJIANG CHENBAO [DONGBEI NET—HEILONGJIANG MORNING POST] (Sept. 3, 2007, 5:53 AM), 
http://heilongjiang.big5.dbw.cn/system/2007/09/03/050957862.shtml. 
 121 Li Hai Tao & Qi Shu Xin, 38ming shimin yin zhiyi Hadagaosu shoufeiquan zhuang gao qi 
zhiguanjituan [Thirty-Eight Citizens Who Questioned the Legality of Toll Fee of Hada Expressway Sued the 
Authorities], ZHONG GUO QING NIAN BAO [CHINA YOUTH DAILY] (Oct 10, 2008, 4:47 AM), http://news.sina. 
com.cn/c/l/2008-10-10/044716427651.shtml. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Hada Gaosugonglu zuori da xiu wan bi [Hada Expressway Finished Recondition], DA QING WANG 
[DA QING NET] (July 21, 2009, 7:05 AM), http://www.dqdaily.com/dqw/xwzx/szxw/2009-07/21/content_ 
136261.htm.  
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. The detail of the settlement is unavailable. 
 126 Dai Duen Fong, Gaoerbao Shi Jian Sho Hai Je Wei Chuan Jian Nan [The Victims of Gaoerbao Case 
Are Having a Hard Time Asserting Their Rights], NANFANG ZHOUMO [NANFANG WEEKEND] (June 10, 2004), 
available at http://bbs.703804.com/thread-1618-1-1.html [hereinafter Case 1]. 
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court rejected all the foregoing cases as class actions, except for the Qinghua 
students suing China Telecom. Although the court did accept the case under 
Article 55 of the CPL,128 it did not utilize the court-approved public notice 
under Article 55.129 Therefore, this case was essentially a joinder claim, where 
the number of the plaintiffs was ascertained before filing the lawsuit, given that 
the court issued no public notice, and no other potential plaintiffs joined the 
lawsuit. 
H. The Underlying Rules of Chinese Class Actions 
In addition to statutory law, another set of rules could be applied in the 
above-mentioned cases. Generally, resolving class disputes in China has 
entailed either the plaintiffs seeking justice through the courts or resorting to 
government or party organizations after disputes occur.130 Plaintiffs continued 
 
In this Article, Case 1 refers to when 1354 consumers sued a health food corporation for the ineffective 
product. Id. The court considered the “Gaoerbao case” to be unsuitable for acceptance as a joinder claim. Id. 
However, it was impractical for more than 1300 plaintiffs to file claims separately. Id. The victims had a hard 
time asserting their rights. Id. 
Case 2 refers to when in August 1995, 580 consumers in Nanjing City sued a retailer for breach of 
contract. Zhu Yu Sheng & Zhang Ming Sheng, Nanjing 580 ren jituansusong an shimo [A Class Action Case 
Involving 580 People in Nanjing], ZHENGFU FAZHI [GOVERNMENT LAW] 24, available at http://www.cnki.net/ 
(China Academic Journals 中国期刊全文数据库 (CAJ)) [hereinafter Case 2]. 
Case 3 refers to the 1998 case where 1018 consumers sued a gas company for contract fraud in 
Nanjing. Teng Xiao Yang, Guoneiz zuida de yichi jituan susongan [The Largest Class Action Cases 
Nationwide], ZHENG FU FA ZHI [GOVERNMENT LAW] 17, available at http://www.cnki.net/ (China Academic 
Journals 中国期刊全文数据库 (CAJ)) [hereinafter Casae 3]. 
Case 4 refers to when in September 1995, 478 consumers in Nantong City, Jiangsu Province sued a 
motorcycle manufacturer and several retailers for their false advertisements and contract fraud. Shi Kai, 478 
ming Xiaofeizhe zhuang gao 14 ge shangjia [478 Consumers Sued 14 Businesses], CHINA MARKET 15, 
available at http://www.cnki.net/ (China Academic Journals 中国期刊全文数据库 (CAJ)) [hereinafter Case 
4]. 
Case 5 refers to the July 2006 case that People’s Court in Huanghua City accepted where 155 
consumers sued a real estate developer for breach of contracts. Ding Jing Rei, Woyuan shouli yiqi she 
fangdichan jituan susongan [The Court Accepted a Class Action Involving Real Estate], PEOPLE’S COURT 
HUANGHUA CITY, http://www.hhfy.gov.cn/detail/00000716/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Case 5].  
 127 Id. 
 128 Wu Fei, supra note 96. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Oster, supra note 3; see also Workers in PRC’s Zhejiang Province Seeks Compensation for Lung 
Disease, XINHUA: WINDOW OF CHINA (May 8, 2001), available at http://wnc.dialog.com/. Victims and their 
families in the silicon dioxide workers’ compensation case visited the authorities of the city, province, and the 
central government. Id. Hence, the authorities put special notice on this case. Id. A group of twenty workers 
took their plea for justice to Beijing—the traditional final resort for peasants seeking justice. Police detained 
them for causing a disturbance, although officers took their petition and passed it on. Id. Eventually, the court 
heard the case and the chief judge of the Wenzhou Intermediate People’s Court in east China’s Zhejiang 
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to petition or visit higher authorities until they received some response to their 
requests. 131  Publicity has been another way of drawing attention. 132  After 
learning about a petition, the authorities may express a certain attitude about 
how to handle the matter.133 If the government supports the use of a class 
action mechanism or some similar method, the courts will accept and hear the 
case.134 The courts will report to the relevant authorities about the progress 
during the handling of the case,135 sometimes even getting involved in the 
enforcement proceedings, for example by distributing compensation to the 
plaintiffs after the cases are decided.136 
Cases that would not harm “social stability” were more likely to be 
accepted as class actions. The term “social stability” has been extensively used 
by the Chinese Party-state as a requirement for a “harmonious society,” which 
the Party-state considers to be the nature of Chinese socialism.137 Preserving 
social stability has also been emphasized as the first priority when the Chinese 
courts handle cases.138 Therefore, the term “social stability” has usually been 
drawn from the courts’ reasoning when they reject a case as a class action.139 
Although there has been no further official or judicial explanation as to the 
 
Province ruled that other farmers who did not join the lawsuit but were diagnosed with silicosis while working 
for the same employers were also eligible for compensation. Id. 
 131 Song Xiang Guo, Dui yi jian 800 duo ming nongmin jituansusongan de sikao [A Review of a Class 
Action Case of 800 Peasants], ZHENGFU FAZHI [GOVERNMENT LAW] 18, available at http://www.cnki.net/ 
(China Academic Journals 中国期刊全文数据库 (CAJ)). In 1994, 800 peasants sued the county government 
and town committee for imposing taxes without a legal basis. Id. When their first attempt failed and they told 
the court officials that they rented several cars planning to visit Beijing, the court dissuaded the peasants from 
doing so and promised them the court would handle their case. Id. 
 132 Most of the cases in this paper were publicized through media to seek the attention of the relevant 
authorities and the public. 
 133 See Dou Shi Chang et al., Quanguo zueida de jituan Susongan shenzhishi mo [The Course of the 
Largest Class Action Case in China], SHANDONG SHENPAN 43–45 (1996), available at http://www.cnki.net/ 
(China Academic Journals 中国期刊全文数据库  (CAJ)). In June of 1996, 4707 peasants in Lingyi, 
Shangdong Province sued an individual enterprise for breach of contract. Id. After the county committee and 
relevant leaders learned of this situation, they urged the court to accept the case as a class action. Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Wang Song Yan, supra note 120. 
 136 Dou Shi Chang et al., supra note 133. 
 137 Zhong Gong Zhong Yiang Guan Yu Jia Chiang Dang Zhi Zheng Nueng Li Jian Xe De Jue Ding [The 
Decision of Central Authority About Enhancing the Ruling Party’s Power], 4th Plenary Session of the 16th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, RENMIN WAN [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE] (Nov. 17, 
2004, 6:56 PM), available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/40531/40746/2994977.html.  
 138 Xiao Yang, Supreme Court President, Address at the Second Plenary Session of the Ninth National 
People’s Congress (Mar. 10, 1999), available at available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-10/20/ 
content_2115434.htm. 
 139 See Jituan susong zeng zhi 301 ren fayuan wei he bu shou li ci ka susong [The Number of Claimants in 
the Phone-Card Class Action Has Gone to 301: Why the Court Do Not Accept the Case], supra note 104. 
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meaning of social stability, based on the observation of the relevant cases, 
social stability seems to be highly related to the court’s or the government’s 
ability to control a case. Usually, a local case within a certain geographical 
area is more likely to be recognized as a class action suit, because the court or 
the government can exercise control over the potential claimants and have the 
capacity to deal with the case. There have been several types of cases handled 
as class actions, including breach of contracts,140 contract frauds,141 workers’ 
compensation,142 and rural disputes.143 Most of these cases were addressed in 
the 1990s or early 2000s. After the 2000s, fewer benchmark cases have been 
handled by class action.144 
 
I. The Courts’ Attitudes Toward Class Actions 
While class disputes handled by class action mechanisms mostly existed in 
the 1990s,145 more recent class disputes have not been treated the same. These 
disputes, such as securities fraud cases that the SPC prohibits the lower courts 
from accepting as class actions, or other types of cases with no class action 
instructions, have not been heard as class actions. This fact corresponds to 
some Chinese scholars’ opinions about the significant change in court attitudes 
since the 1990s. 146  Most class actions in recent years have not been 
encouraged. The courts have either rejected the cases or asked the claimants to 
file claims separately due to the cases’ “unsuitability” for the class action 
mechanism. 147  This reason mainly arose from the concern that too many 
plaintiffs joining the lawsuit would increase the complexity of the case and 
lead to possible delays.148 Ironically, the courts have rejected the cases based 
on the very reason that the class action mechanism was established in the first 
place: “social stability.” 
The attitude of the Chinese courts is not difficult to surmise. One of the 
reasons is that the increase in the number of class disputes exceeds the courts’ 
 
 140 See Case 2, supra note 126. 
 141 Id. 
 142 See Workers in PRC’s Zhejiang Province Seeks Compensation for Lung Disease, supra note 130.  
 143 See Dou Shi Chang et al., supra note 133. 
 144 See generally Xue, supra note 59.  
 145 See generally Id. 
 146 Dou Shi Chang et al., supra note 133, at 210. 
 147 See supra notes 122–30 and accompanying text. 
 148 See Fong, supra note 126. 
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capacity.149 In a highly populated country such as China, disputes can often 
involve a large number of plaintiffs. According to some statistics, the number 
of lawsuits in China has increased in recent years.150 Some Chinese judges and 
court clerks have admitted being worried that if they accept a certain case as a 
class action, other potential claimants will likely ask the court to apply the 
same mechanism as well.151 With limited resources, the courts prefer not to 
utilize class action mechanisms to avoid opening the door to all potential 
claimants. While Chinese courts sometimes accept cases that satisfy the 
requirements for joinder claims 152  (where the number of the plaintiffs is 
determined), the courts prevent the use of the class action mechanism under 
Article 55 of the CPL, under which the requirement of public notice might 
bring more potential plaintiffs into the case. The judges’ limited knowledge 
and experience is another reason for their reluctance to accept class action 
cases.153 Some judges indicated that they have never handled class actions, nor 
have they heard of their colleagues having decided this type of case.154 
The most fundamental reason might be that the courts do not have the 
confidence and power to make important decisions. Class disputes usually 
involve a great number of individuals or public interests. With the Chinese 
people’s growing rights-consciousness155 and China’s promotion of judicial 
reforms, 156  the Chinese have learned that the courts could potentially be 
another platform to assert people’s rights. However, when deciding gigantic 
cases, the courts are under pressure from the authorities that control the 
 
 149 Class Action Litigation in China, supra note 5, at 1525.  
 150 Id. at 1531. 
 151 Xue, supra note 59, at 227. 
 152 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa [Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of 
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, art. 54), reprinted in THE 
CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW AND COURT RULES OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 54 (Wei Luo ed., 2006) (“A 
joint litigation in which one party has numerous litigants may be brought by the representatives elected by the 
litigants of the party. The act of litigation taken by these representatives shall bind all litigants of the party 
whom they represent. However, any substitution of representatives, relinquishing claims, acceptance of claims 
of the opposing party, or negotiating settlement shall be approved by the litigants of the party.”). There were 
two amendments to the CPL in 2007 and 2012; the article number was changed to 53 in 2012. See Civil 
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=6033 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2014). ) (The article number was changed to 53 in 2012.). 
 153 Stanley B. Lubman, Dispute Resolution in China After Deng Xiaoping: “Mao and Mediation” 
Revisited, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 229, 311 (1997). 
 154 Id. at 311–13. 
 155 Xue Yonghui, supra note 59, at 216. 
 156 Renmin Fayuan Dierge Wunian Gaige Gangyao [The Third Five-Year Reform Plan of the People’s 
Courts (2009-2013)], XINHUA: WINDOW OF CHINA (March 26, 2009), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ 
legal/2009-03/26/content_11074127.htm. 
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finances and appointment of judges, as well as from media reports and popular 
protests.157 To avoid this pressure, embarrassment, and responsibility, courts 
that lack actual independence tend to reject class action cases. They would 
prefer to leave the decisions to other party-state departments.158 
Another internal court document more vividly illustrates the courts’ attitude 
toward class actions. Geigaofa Notice No. 180, issued by the Guangxi 
Autonomous Area High People’s Court in 2003, specified thirteen types of 
cases that the court should not accept and hear.159 The cases included collective 
financing disputes, direct marketing contract disputes, real estate disputes 
resulting from the government’s administrative decisions, workers’ 
compensation, securities cases, etc., which would most likely become class 
disputes. 160  This internal document was sharply criticized and opposed by 
many legal professionals and scholars after it was disclosed by the media.161 
They believed that the court was avoiding risks and transferring potential 
conflicts to other government agencies, thereby depriving people of their 
litigation rights.162 Some scholars even pointed out that this type of “internal 
document” is actually the product of judicial institutions being transformed 
into administrative agencies.163 
The preface of Notice No. 180 explained the reason for its issuance. The 
court believed that these types of cases are extensive, sensitive, and highly 
publicized, and hence should be handled by the government or other 
agencies.164 If these cases are accepted by the court, they may be postponed for 
a long time, resulting in the impairment of social stability and the image of the 
court’s capability to enforce laws.165 Some of the cases may even result in 
mass disturbances if the plaintiffs’ claims cannot be fulfilled.166 The Guangxi 
High Court judge who drafted the document indicated that it was done in 
 
 157 Benjamin L. Liebman, China’s Courts: Restricted Reform, 21 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2007). 
 158 See id. at 28.  
 159 Lou Chang Ping, Guangxi fayuan weihe bushuuli 13lei an jian (广西法院为何不受理 13 类案件) 
[Why Guang Xi Court Did Not Accept Thirteen Types of Cases], RENMIN WAN [PEOPLE DAILY ONLINE] (Aug. 
12, 2004, 4:07 AM), http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/2702836.html. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Ge Mao Fei, Neibo wenjian shi fayuan xinahenghua de chanwu [Internal Document Is the Product of 
Courts Turning Administrative], RENMIN WAN [PEOPLE’S ONLINE DAILY] (Aug. 17, 2004, 1:12 PM), http:// 
www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/1034/2716965.html . 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 See generally id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Ge Mao Fei, supra note 161. 
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accordance with relevant laws, the SPC’s interpretations, and the spirit of the 
SPC’s instructions with adjustment to account for the Guangxi area’s special 
condition, but he could not provide the exact content of the laws or 
interpretations. 167  The vice president of the court also explained that the 
purpose of Notice No. 180 was to preserve social stability and protect the 
parties’ interests.168 
Although the SPC’s interpretations and instructions for this document are 
not available, a general idea can be inferred from similar documents. For 
example, an interpretation of the SPC in 1991 gave instructions as to whether 
the People’s Court should accept cases involving collective financing 
disputes.169 The SPC specified, “For this type of case, because the government 
and the relevant authorities have already exercised a great amount of effort, it 
would be unfavorable to the parties involved and inefficient to transfer the case 
to the courts to solve the problem.”170  
It is again evident from these instructions that the Chinese courts do not 
welcome class actions. Chinese scholars have concluded that “the policy”171 of 
the courts to handle class disputes is that: “(1) They tend to reject cases if 
possible; (2) if there appears no proper reason to reject, they ask plaintiffs to 
file claims separately.”172 Delay is sometimes another approach that courts 
adopt, because plaintiffs may give up suing. Claims that are eventually 
accepted or heard, such as joinder claims or class actions, are almost always so 
due to the support of the government party or agencies.173 Therefore, rather 
than saying that the success of the class actions depends on the courts’ attitude, 
it would be more accurate to conclude that the government’s attitude takes 
priority. 
 
 167 Luo, supra note 159. 
 168 See id. ( “It would be more favorable for these thirteen types of cases to be handled by the government 
or by the Communist Party. Because some of these cases have no governing laws, the courts would have 
difficulty in enforcing the judgments after the decisions were made, which might negatively impact social 
stability.”).  
 169 ECON. DIV., SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN JINGJI SHENPANTING GUANYU DUI NAN NING 
SHI JINLONG CHELIANG PEIJIANCHANG JI ZI JIUFEN SHIFOU YOU RENMIN FAYUAN SHOULI WENTI DE DAFU 
(最高人民法院经济审判庭关于对南宁市金龙车辆配件厂集资纠纷是否由人民法院受理问题的答复) 
[THE REPLY FROM SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. TO NAN NING CITY ABOUT THE WHETHER PEOPLE’S COURT SHOULD 
HANDLE JINGLUNG FUND RAISING CLASS DISPUTES], reprinted in 新编中华人民共和国常用司法解释全书 
[NEW JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE BOOK COMMON PEOPLE] 250 (China Legal Publ’g H., 5th Ed. 2004).  
 170 Id. 
 171 Although they used the term “policy,” there is no official documentary clearly establishing this point. 
 172 Xue, supra note 59, at 219. 
 173 Liebman, supra note 157, at 39. 
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J. The Roles of Legal Professions and Nonprofit Institutions 
The role of the courts in China is different from that in Western 
countries.174 It has been considered inappropriate to “equat[e] Chinese courts 
with their Western counterparts.”175 Due to their lack of independence, the 
courts have been minor actors in the Chinese state.176 This viewpoint is well-
demonstrated by class disputes. Just as Notice No. 180 indicated that class 
disputes should be handled by the government and other agencies,177  it is 
apparent that the courts have avoided deciding on cases that involve large 
stakes, such as class disputes. 
The role of Chinese courts in class actions does not come into play until 
they obtain support or instructions from the party-state. They hear class action 
cases depending on the party-state’s opinion; they ask for instruction.178 As 
Liebman noted, Chinese courts are more similar to “a number of state 
bureaucracies with the power to resolve disputes.”179 The purpose of the courts 
in hearing the case is to resolve a dispute as soon as possible,180 instead of 
ensuring that every claimant’s right is fulfilled. They would prefer mediation 
or settlement that can avoid the appeal process or any further judicial 
proceedings. Hence, usually before or during the proceedings, the courts will 
either formally or informally invite the parties to join a mediation held by the 
court or encourage the parties to settle.181 After the court decides a case, the 
judges are often involved in the enforcement of the judgment182 to demonstrate 
their efforts in ending the dispute and to be praised by higher courts or 
government agencies.183 
Compared to the conservative and cautious attitude of the courts in utilizing 
the class action mechanism, Chinese lawyers have played a more creative role 
than expected in promoting class actions in China. They have helped their 
clients file class actions. If the cases are not accepted as class actions, their role 
 
 174 Id. at 3. 
 175 Id.  
 176 Id. at 3–4. 
 177 See Luo, supra note 159. 
 178 See generally Liebman, supra note 157, at 1532. 
 179 See id. at 3–4. 
 180 Id. at 24. 
 181 See generally Dongfang Elec. Corp. Public Notice of Litigation, supra note 90. 
 182 See Dou, supra note 133. 
 183 Zuigaofayuan fuyuanzhang Xi Xiao Ming dui Qingdao zhong yuan gong zuo zuo chu pi shi [The 
Deputy of SPC Commented on Qingdao Intermediate Court’s Work], supra note 93. 
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transforms into creatively helping the claimants file joinder claims,184 such as 
replacing the role of courts by issuing public notices for potential claimants to 
join the suits before filing claims.185 Even though it is still a “joinder claim” in 
theory, it has a similar feature and spirit to class actions, because potential 
plaintiffs informed by a lawyer-issued notice have an opportunity to join such 
lawsuits. In other situations, where the courts have indicated that only separate 
claims would be accepted, some lawyers have also filed separate claims in an 
attempt to seek justice for their clients.186 In cases involving massive public 
interest, such as pollution cases, several nonprofit organizations or institutions 
have also provided legal aid to assist plaintiffs in asserting their rights.187 
K. Conclusions: China 
The approach used by the Chinese government and the Chinese courts to 
handle the tainted milk case may have confused the world, especially because 
the country has the class action mechanism specified in its statutory 
framework. China apparently adopted another approach instead of applying the 
class action mechanism in the CPL. This Article attempts to explain why this 
phenomenon exists by describing the general actual practice of resolving class 
disputes in China. 
China has experimented with its legal and judicial systems.188 However, the 
class action mechanism seems to be incompatible. It has been a question of 
whether Chinese courts can play an effective role in a nondemocratic 
government system.189 This question becomes more critical when taking class 
disputes into consideration. Having such a different approach and attitude 
toward class disputes may arise from the Chinese government’s desire for 
control, or it may be based on the goal of preserving social stability under 
Chinese socialism. No matter what the underlying reason, the purpose of the 
class action mechanism in China is actually more of a way of defusing 
potential unrest to avoid social disorder, rather than a legal mechanism 
generally accessible to the Chinese people to call for individual justice. As a 
commentator suggested, “[P]ermitting grievances to be raised through class 
 
 184 See generally Dongfang Elec. Corp. Public Notice of Litigation, supra note 90. 
 185 Id.  
 186 Cika yonghu shi zhan dao di Zhongguodianxin jiang bei gao ji bai hui [Consumers Determined to 
Continue Fight For Their Rights; China Telecom Will Be Sued Hundreds of Times], supra note 109. 
 187 See Oster & Fong, supra note 71. 
 188 Liebman, supra note 157, at 31. 
 189 Id. at 2. 
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actions . . . may be preferable to such complaints not being heard at all—or 
being raised on the streets.”190 The introduction of the class action mechanism 
was originally intended to solve class disputes efficiently and counteract 
possible social disorder. When the Chinese people realized that this mechanism 
could also be used as a means to assert their rights, the Chinese government 
became concerned about the application of this mechanism, for fear of creating 
another source of disturbance.191 Therefore, while the class action mechanism 
was once open to Chinese people, it is no longer the same at present. 
The use of the Chinese class action mechanism is more an exception rather 
than a generally accessible legal action. A comment from a Chinese law 
professor illustrates this phenomenon: “After learning [that] so many class 
dispute cases were rejected or divided into separate claims, I had no confidence 
in telling students whether the class action mechanism specified in the CPL 
actually functions or not.” 192  Unless they obtain support from relevant 
authorities, the courts do not accept claims as class actions, even if the claims 
satisfy relevant requirements. The claimants’ claims have either been rejected 
or have had to be realized by being filed separately, which has not been 
economically rational. There appears to be substantial gaps between the 
statutory framework and the real practice of the Chinese class action 
mechanism. 
However, with fundamental changes in Chinese society and the emerging 
“rights consciousness” of the Chinese people,193 it may be questionable to what 
extent they can stand being enjoined from their rights to access the courts. 
Even though Chinese courts have modestly applied the class action 
mechanism, the Chinese people have unrelentingly tried to push its boundaries. 
Although sometimes they knew that their protests would be in vain, they still 
continued to fight for their rights. What the Qinghua University students 
demonstrated in the case against China Telecom offers the best illustration: 
“We did not take the settlement offer because we wanted China Telecom to 
examine their service and attitudes toward consumers.”194 Their efforts might 
not have gained the result they desired in their case. However, they 
 
 190 Id. at 39. 
 191 Id.  
 192 Id. at 214 (citing Fu Yu Lin, Quntixing jiufen de sifajiuji [The Judicial Relief for Class Disputes], 
available at http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=19634 (last visited Sept. 11, 2013)). 
 193 Lubman, supra note 153, at 297. 
 194 See Qinghua xuesheng su Zhongguodianxin an 21 ri kaiting [The Hearing of Qinghua Students Suing 
China Telecom Case on 21], supra note 102.  
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successfully made their case heard by the government, the media, and legal 
professionals, focusing attention to their case and the class action mechanism 
in practice. 
II. INTRODUCTION: TAIWAN 
With certain similarities in early Chinese culture and history but 
distinctions in embracing democratic political systems, and the influence of 
Japanese colonization, Taiwan offers an excellent comparison of how class 
action mechanisms can evolve in different environments. Taiwan started 
applying class action mechanisms in several special law areas, such as 
consumer protection and investor protection in 1994. The general introduction 
of the class action mechanism was not incorporated into the Taiwan Code of 
Civil Procedure (“TCCP”) until 2001. Even though class action mechanisms 
are available to the public by statute, the number of class actions has been 
low.195 By analyzing the law and empirical cases, this Article hopes to examine 
the reasons why class action mechanisms in Taiwan have not been 
substantially utilized. 
A. RCA Pollution and Occupational Injury Case by the LAF 
The Radio Corporation of America (“RCA”) case is one of the mass tort 
cases that best illustrate the features of class action practice in Taiwan. This 
case was about whether RCA had illegally disposed of toxic waste.196 One 
former employee of the RCA factory recalled experiences: “No wonder those 
foreign supervisors all drank bottled water. Only we silly workers drank toxic 
water every day. We lived and ate inside the factory. Even the water for 
showers was poisonous.”197 In 1960, RCA established factories in Taiwan as 
foreign investments flourished.198 The company was allegedly pouring toxic 
waste and organic solvents that were internationally considered possible 
cancer-inducing toxins into illegally dug wells, polluting land and water 
resources.199 Over 30,000 RCA ex-employees suffered from toxic chemical 
 
 195 Liebman, supra note 157, at 34. 
 196 Self-help Ass’n for RCA Emp. Suffering from Cancer & Taiwan Ass’n for Victims of Occuptaional 
Accidents & Diseases, RCA—The Unacceptable Face of Capitalism in Taiwan, 39 ASIAN LABOR UPDATE 
(Apr.–June 2001), available at http://www.amrc.org.hk/alu_article/occupational_health_and_safety/rca_the_ 
unacceptable_face_of_capitalism_in_taiwan (last visited Jan. 26, 2014). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. 
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poisoning as a result of drinking polluted underground water or inhaling the 
evaporated toxic gas.200 By mid-2001, 1059 people were suffering from cancer, 
216 people had died from the disease, and 102 people had various kinds of 
tumors. 201  None of them had ever received any compensation for these 
occupationally related illnesses.202 
The Self-help Association for RCA Employees Suffering from Cancer 
(“SHA”) was established in 1998.203 After numerous futile protests by the ex-
employees, the SHA tried to bring a lawsuit against RCA and relevant 
companies.204 However, due to its lack of legal knowledge and experience, the 
SHA encountered various difficulties, one of which was the procedural hurdle 
of standing to sue. Because the SHA is not a legal person, it did not qualify as 
a plaintiff according to the old TCCP.205 After repeated failures, the SHA 
eventually sought help from the Legal Aid Foundation (“LAF”). The LAF 
organized a team of attorneys and a consulting team of specialists in different 
fields,206 representing the former RCA employees with a claim of NTD $2.4 
billion207 against RCA and related companies, including General Electric and 
Thomson.208 The litigation is still in progress as of this writing.209 
The LAF was established to provide accessible legal services for 
disadvantaged groups. 210  Funded by the Judicial Yuan, the LAF began 
operations in 2004211 and currently has twenty-one branch offices throughout 
 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 FAFU NIANBAO [LAF’S ANNUAL REPORT OF YEAR 2008], http://www.laf.org.tw/upload/2009071415 
5839.pdf (last visited May 1, 2014).  
 203 Self-help Ass’n, supra note 196. 
 204 Id. 
 205 See Injury Ass’n, RCA shouhaizhe sifa diyizhan!Li ai gongren shoudu chutingzuozheng (RCA受害者
司法第一戰！罹癌工人首度出庭作證 RCA 毒害工人，受害者司法第一戰！) [The First Hearing of the 
RCA Case, The Ex-employee Who Suffered Cancer Testifies], Nov. 10, 2009, KU LAO WANG [SUFFERING 
EMPLOYEE’S NET] available at http://www.coolloud.org.tw/node/48273 (last visited May 1, 2014). 
 206 Id.  
 207 The currency exchange as rate as of January 26, 2014 was 30.25 New Taiwan Dollars to 1 USD.  
 208 Injury Ass’n., supra note 205. 
 209 Id.  
 210 About Us: Who We Are, LEGAL AID FOUND., http://www.laf.org.tw/en/a1_1.php (last visited May 1, 
2014). 
 211 Id. There were three organizations that promoted the formation of the LAF—the Judicial Reform 
Foundation, the Taipei Bar Association, and the Taiwan Association for Human Rights. Id. With the 
community efforts and the support of the Judicial Yuan, the Legal Aid Act was passed on December 23, 2003 
and promulgated on January 7, 2004. Id. 
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Taiwan.212  The LAF’s major mission is providing systematic assistance to 
those in need of professional legal assistance who have no ability to pay the 
court and legal fees.213 One of the criteria for legal aid is that the applicant’s 
monthly income is below the stipulated threshold, 214  which covers most 
socially and financially disadvantaged groups, such as blue-collar laborers, 
women, children, and indigenous people.215 
By providing extensive and diversified litigation services, 216  such as 
consultation, drafting, and representation for mediation and settlement, 217 
ranging from civil and criminal to administrative cases, the LAF has a strong 
image of promoting the public interest.218As a semi-government association, 
the LAF participates in various official and unofficial projects219 and accepts 
legal aid cases assigned by government agencies. 220  All the coverage and 
regulations of legal aid have been specified in the Legal Aid Act (LAA).221 For 
cases outside the LAF’s scope but requiring legal aid just the same, the 
examining committee can approve aid through a resolution.222 While the LAF 
has covered both litigation and nonlitigation, the expansion of services beyond 
the original scope has indicated the need for adjustments to the LAF’s 
operational flow to fulfill all the tasks. 
 
 212 Id. There are branch offices in Taipei, Taichung, Tainan, Kaohsiung, Hualian, Taoyuan, Hsinchu, 
Changhua, Yilan, Taitung, Keelung, Miaoli, Nantou, Yunlin, Chiayi, Pingtung, Penghu, Kinman, Matsu, 
Banciao, and Shihlin. Id. 
 213 Id. The provision of legal aid helps people in upholding their constitutionally protected right to access 
the court system. See id. 
 214 Falu fuzhu fa [Legal Aids Act] (promulgated by Legislative Yuan, Jan. 7, 2004, effective June 20, 
2004), art. 3 (Taiwan),reprinted in Legal Aids Act (Taiwan, 2004), http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/ 
LawContent.aspx?PCODE=A0030157 (last visited May 1, 2014) (“In this Act, . . . indigent persons refer to 
persons who qualify as being low-income household under the Social Assistance Act or whose monthly 
disposable income and assets are below the prescribed standard. The Foundation is responsible for issuing 
Resolutions to define the standard stated in this Article.”). 
 215 About Us: Who We Are, supra note 210. 
 216 About Us: Mission and Vision, LEGAL AID FOUND., http://www.laf.org.tw/en/a1_2.php (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2013). 
 217 FAFU NIANBAO [LAF’s Annual Report of Year 2008], supra note 202.  
 218 See About Us: Mission and Vision, supra note 216.  
 219 See FAFU NIANBAO [LAF’s Annual Report of Year 2008], supra note 202. 
 220 See Legal Aids Act, art. 5 ( “[The LAF] handles the projects of legal aids commissioned by the 
governmental agencies or other groups”).  
 221 Id.  
 222 See Legal Aids Act, art. 2 (“The term ‘legal aids’ as used in this Law refers to the following 
matters . . . other resolutions reached by the Foundation.”). 
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B. Civil Procedure Law in Taiwan 
Two types of mechanisms are closest to class actions in Taiwan. The first is 
that multiple claimants whose claims have “arisen from the same public 
nuisance, traffic accident, product defect, or the same transaction or occurrence 
of any kind,” which can appoint one or more representatives among 
themselves.223 With the motion or consent by the claimants and the court’s 
approval,224 the court can issue a public notice for potential claimants to join 
the action,225 as well as appoint an attorney as a representative.226 It is an opt-in 
design, which simplifies the filing procedure, since the claimants will not 
automatically be included in the lawsuit but will need further actions to join it. 
Except for the stated feature, this type of class action mechanism does not 
significantly differ from traditional joinder or intervention claims used for 
solving multiple-party disputes.227 
The second type is that charitable associations or government-sanctioned 
organizations (“GSOs”) can bring lawsuits on behalf of their members or the 
general public.228 The inception of the implementation of this type of class 
 
 223 Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure, art. 44-2, JUDICIAL YUAN REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Jun. 25, 2003), 
available at http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT0201.asp (“When multiple parties, whose 
common interests have arisen from the same public nuisance, traffic accident, product defect, or the same 
transaction or occurrence of any kind, appoint one or more persons from themselves in accordance with the 
provision of Art. 41 to sue for the same category of legal claims, the court may, with the consent of the 
appointed party, or upon the original appointed party’s motion which the court considers appropriate, publish a 
notice to the effect that other persons with the same common interests may join the action by filing a pleading 
within a designated period of time . . . . Those persons so joining shall be deemed to have made the same 
appointment in accordance with the provisions of Art. 41.”). 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. By filing a pleading within a designated period of time, those persons so joining are deemed to 
agree with the appointment of the representative. Id. 
 226 See id. art. 44-4. “When the court or the presiding judge has duly appointed an attorney to act as the 
special representative or advocate for a party, the compensation to be paid to such appointed attorney shall be 
determined in the discretion of the court or the presiding judge.” Id. art. 77-25 (. “[The compensation] shall be 
included as part of litigation expenses.”) Id. 
 227 See Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure, art. 44-2.  
 228 See id. art. 44-1 (“Multiple parties with common interests who are members of the same incorporated 
charitable association may, to the extent permitted by said association’s purpose as prescribed in its bylaws, 
appoint such association as an appointed party to sue on behalf of them.”); see also Consumer Protection Law 
(promulgated by Taiwan, Jan. 11, 1994, effective Jan. 13, 1994) art. 50, available at http://law.moj.gov.tw/ 
Eng/LawClass/LawSearchNo.aspx?PC=J0170001&DF=&SNo=50 (“Where numerous consumers are injured 
as the result of the same incident, a consumer protection group may take assignment of the rights of claims 
from 20 or more consumers and bring litigation in its own name. Consumers may revoke such assignment of 
the rights of claims before the close of oral arguments, in which case they shall notify the court.”); Securities 
Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act (promulgated by Taiwan, Jan. 17, 2002, effective Jan. 17, 2002) 
art. 28, available at http://eng.selaw.com.tw/FLAWDOC01.asp?lsid=FL007109&lno=34 (“For protection of 
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action was derived from specific areas of law, such as the Consumer Protection 
Act (“CPA”) and the Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act 
(“IPA”). These GSOs usually provide efficient ways for potential plaintiffs to 
opt in to the class action. They also usually enjoy some advantages, such as 
discounts on court fees for bringing class actions and the security-free 
provisional seizure.229 With the introduction of the class action mechanism into 
the TCCP in 2003, the general guidelines of class action mechanisms have 
become broadly available, rather than being limited to special areas of law. 
However, cases initiated under the TCCP are still scarce.230 
Being one of the civil law countries, Taiwanese law shows the influence of 
German and Japanese law.231 When disputes occur, standing is the first issue 
that needs to be settled. Similar to the rules in most civil law countries, there 
are several types of standing that need to be strictly complied with to initiate a 
lawsuit. The typical requirement to sue on behalf of others is to acquire 
consent from the “real interested party,” unless otherwise specified.232 The 
purpose of such rigorous control over the standing to sue is due to the concerns 
over the binding effect of res judicata, which is especially important when the 
judgment will bind other claimants who do not actually participate in the 
proceedings. The function of the screening of the standing at the beginning is 
to ensure the justifiable binding effect on the right parties. 
 
the public interest, within the scope of this Act and its articles of incorporation, the protection institution may 
submit a matter to arbitration or institute an action in its own name with respect to a securities or futures matter 
arising from a single cause that is injurious to multiple securities investors or futures traders, after having been 
so empowered by not less than 20 securities investors or futures traders.”). 
 229 See Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 222, art. 77-22 (“The appointed party who initiated an 
action in accordance with the provision of Art. 44-2 may temporarily be exempted from paying the portion of 
the court costs in excess of NTD 600,000 if the amount of court costs taxed is more than NTD 600,000. No 
court cost will be taxed on an action initiated in accordance with the provision of Art. 44-3.”); see also 
Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act, art. 34, supra note 227 (“A court may rule that the 
protection institution’s application as referred to in the preceding paragraph be exempted from the requirement 
for provision of security.”). 
 230 Kuo-Chang Huang, Collaborative Case Study Project on Global Class Action & Group Litigation, 
Appendix III (2011). 
 231 Kaun-Ling Shen & Alex, Yueh-Ping Yang, Multi-Party Proceedings in Taiwan: Representatives and 
Group Actions, GLOBAL CLASS ACTIONS EXCHANGE 4 (2007), globalclassactions.stanford.edu/content/multi-
party-proceedings-taiwan-representative-and-group-actions (“Taiwan is a civil law system country, which may 
be observed from the facts that both the Taiwan Code of Civil Procedure and the Civil Code show the 
influence of German law”). 
 232 This spirit is close to the idea of “adequate representation” in American legal theory. See FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23(a)(4) (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all 
members only if the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”).  
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C. Mass Tort Cases 
Prior to the RCA case, a few mass tort cases also utilized class action 
mechanisms under special laws before the general mechanism became 
available. One such case involved the collapse of Doctor’s Home. On 
September 21, 1999, a 7.6-Mw earthquake occurred in Jiji, Nantou County, 
Taiwan.233 The “921 earthquake,” also known as the Jiji earthquake, caused 
2405 deaths and 10,713 injured, and damage amounting to USD $38 billion.234 
Public anger began to mount over shoddy construction practices that were later 
proven to be responsible for the high number of casualties,235 including the 
actions of the architects and construction companies involved in the collapse of 
the residential community, Doctor’s Home. The Consumer’s Foundation, 
Chinese Taipei (“CFCT”), assisted by the bar association, was the GSO that 
represented the victims to negotiate with said parties, but no consensus was 
reached.236 After class actions were filed on behalf of the victims who resided 
in the collapsed buildings, 237  negotiations resumed. The construction 
companies finally agreed to pay compensation for the deaths or personal 
injuries from the collapse of the buildings, but the parties still could not agree 
on property damage. 238  In January 2002, the district court held that the 
construction companies and related parties should pay compensation and 
punitive damage three times the amount of the actual damages awarded.239 Due 
to the urgent financial needs of the victims, the CFCT again negotiated with 
the defendants and finally reached a settlement.240 
Founded in 1980, CFCT is the oldest independent, nonprofit GSO that 
promotes and supports the consumer movement. 241  Because CFCT is less 
aligned with the government, it has been mostly funded by donations from the 
 
 233 Devastating Earthquake Strikes Greece and Taiwan in September, EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING RES. 
INST. (Oct., 1999), available at https://www.eeri.org/lfe/pdf/Taiwan_ChiChi_Article_Oct99.pdf.  
 234 Natural Disasters and Poor Countries: Jiji Earthquake (1999), ABC-CLIO: HISTORY AND THE 
HEADLINES, http://www.historyandtheheadlines.abc-clio.com/ContentPages/ContentPage.aspx?entryId=14741 
92&currentSection=1473215&productid=29/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2014). 
 235 Building Firms Under Investigation, TAIPEI TIMES, (Sept. 26, 1999), http://www.taipeitimes.com/ 
News/front/archives/1999/09/26/4034. 
 236 “Boshi dejia” Tuantisusong Yuanmanluomu [Court Opinion of Doctor’s Home], CONSUMERS’ 
FOUND., CHINESE TAIPEI (Jan. 1, 1993), http://www.consumers.org.tw/unit412.aspx?id=83. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. The damage amount was: actual damage of NTD $219,914,966 and a punitive damage of NTD 
$659,744,898, which was NTD $870,659,864 in total. Id. 
 240 Id. A settlement was reached among the all the parties by the amount of NTD $281,733,450. 
 241 About Consumer’s Foundation, Chinese Taipei, CONSUMER’S FOUND., CHINESE TAIPEI, http://www. 
consumers.org.tw/unit130.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2013). 
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society at large. 242  According to the CPA, only GSOs can initiate class 
actions.243 Being the only one that has the ability to initiate lawsuits among 
accredited consumer protection organizations,244  CFCT surprisingly has no 
staff attorney of its own due to limited funding and has to resort to pro bono 
attorneys on a case-by-case basis.245 To respond to public expectations, the 
CFCT has to handle class actions in accordance with the following criteria, 
given such limited resources: whether a case (1) has serious deaths or injuries; 
(2) involves public interests; (3) arouses society’s expectations; and (4) is 
feasible for filing a lawsuit.246 
Mass tort cases can also be taken care of when government agencies get 
involved. The residents living in Mailiao having their rights supported by the 
local government is one example. Formosa Petrochemical Corporation’s 
(FPC)247 Mailiao oil refinery’s No. 6 Naphtha Cracking Project (“6-NCP”) was 
Asia’s fifth largest and Taiwan’s largest refinery.248 After a massive series of 
 
 242 See Consumers Foundation Chinese Taipei, CONSUMERSINTERNATIONAL.ORG (available at http:// 
www.consumersinternational.org/our-members/member-directory/Consumers%20Foundation%20Chinese%20 
Taipei) (last visited Feb. 12, 2014) (“Consumers’ Foundation, Chinese Taipei (CFCT) was founded in 1980. 
CFCT is an independent, non-profit organization. It is not aligned with or supported by any political party or 
industry.”); Email from Ou Yang Li, Executive Secretary, CFCT, to Jing-Huey Shao (May 7, 2010, 4:32 PM) 
(on file with author). 
 243 Consumer Protection Law, supra note 228, art. 49 (“A consumers protection group, which has been 
established for more than 3 years after its approval, has obtained upon application a rating of excellence by the 
Consumer Protection Commission, maintains a special staff dealing with consumer protection, and meeting 
any of the following requirements, may, with the approval of the consumer ombudsman , bring in its own 
name an action for damages to consumers in accordance with Article 50.”) Implicitly, only such consumer 
protection groups can bring class action lawsuits under the Act. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. (“If a consumer protection group brings litigation in accordance with the preceding paragraph, it 
shall retain a lawyer to litigate on its behalf. The engaged lawyer may request the reimbursement of any 
necessary expenses but not claim any compensation for such litigation.”). Implicitly, if the Act allows 
consumer protection groups to hire lawyers on a case-by-case basis but does not provide that the CFCT will 
provide its full-time lawyers, it follows that it will only provide for pro-bono lawyers on a case by case basis. 
See also Shelly Shan, Crisis-hit CFCT Receives NT$210 Million in Donations, CHINAPOST, Sept. 3, 2005, 
available at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/business/asia/2005/09/03/67988/Crisis-hit-CFCT.html (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2014) (“According to a CFCT statement, the foundation needs an estimated NT$288.8 million to pay 
for overhead, including the costs of inspections, investigations, press conferences, educational activities and 
other administrative expenses. Lawyers doing pro-bono work and volunteers have helped CFCT save over 
NT$400 million in overhead, the statement showed.”). 
 246 Id. 
 247 The Inception of the No. 6 Naphtha Cracking Project and Its Final Settlement in Mailiao, FORMOSA 
PETROCHEMICAL CORP., http://www.fpcc.com.tw/English/No.6/project%20inception.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 
2013). 
 248 Taiwan, MARCON INT’L, available at http://www.marcon.com/index.cfm?SectionListsID=49& 
PageID=1723 (last visited Feb. 12, 2014) (“In 2007, Taiwan was the world’s fifth-largest importer of liquefied 
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fires in the 6-NCP in July 2010,249 the FPC shut down the 6-NCP in Mailiao. 
However, the series of massive fires in a month in the Formosa facilities drew 
angry protests from local residents250  due to concern over suspected toxic 
fumes.251 Although no injuries occurred in the incident, the smoldering 6-NCP 
produced a considerable amount of ashes, and moisture in the air was filled 
with chemicals produced by burning heavy oil.252 The pollution may have 
impacted the aquaculture products grown by fish farmers in Yunlin, likely 
resulting in tremendous personal injuries and financial losses.253 
The Yunlin county government has been supportive in this matter, 
establishing an information platform immediately after the 6-NCP accident and 
fully disclosing the handling process.254 In response to the resentment and 
diversified opinions among local residents, several mediation sessions were 
scheduled and township chiefs and representatives of the fishermen’s and 
farmers’ associations were invited to discuss the damage and proper claims.255 
Additionally, a public dispute resolution procedure was held for urgent 
relief.256  After these efforts, the FPC agreed to pay NTD $500 million to 
compensate local residents.257 Responding to the demands from the Yunlin 
county government, the FPC also paid for employment consultancy and 
cooperative programs to increase available jobs for local residents.258 
 
natural gas.”); Alex Pevzner, Fire Shuts Formosa Petrochemical Refinery, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2010, http:// 
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703995104575390310223268720.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2013). 
 249 No. 6 Naphtha Cracking Project and Economic Development, INT’L ZINC ASS’N, (Apr. 2004) available 
at http://www.npc.com.tw/images_new_1/images_2013/No._6_Naphtha_Cracking_Project_Briefing_E.pdf. 
 250 Jonathan Standing & Rachel Lee, Another Plant Fire Hits Taiwan’s Formosa Petrochem, REUTERS 
(OCT. 3, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/03/formosa-idUSTOE69200N20101003. 
 251 Grace Kuo, Formosa Plastics Reaches Mailiao Settlement, TAIWAN REV. (Sept 3, 2010), http:// 
taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xitem=116409&ctnode=205&mp=1. 
 252 Cai, Ying-Wen Consoled Southern Aquaculture Farmers Suffered from the Sixth Naphtha Cracker 
Plant Fire; Magistrate Su Instructed to Assist Damage Claims, SAFETY ISSUE FOR THE FORMOSA PLASTICS’ 
PETROCHEMICAL CORP. (JULY 28, 2010), http://fpcc.yunlin.gov.tw/eng/news/Details.aspx?Parser=9,14,25,,,, 
97,,,,2. 
 253 Id. 
 254 County Strives to Mediate 6-NCP Accident, SAFETY ISSUE FOR THE FORMOSA PLASTICS’ 
PETROCHEMICAL CORP. (Aug. 19, 2010), http://fpcc.yunlin.gov.tw/eng/news/Details.aspx?Parser=9,14,25,,,, 
115,,,,1. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id.  
 257 See id.  
 258 See Kuo, supra note 251. 
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D. Securities Class Actions 
Devising special arrangements for securities cases is especially necessary 
in Taiwan since its securities markets are dominated by individual investors 
who are usually economically and informationally inferior to securities firms 
or issuers.259 By offering consultation and mediation services regarding regular 
securities and futures trading disputes, 260  the Investor Protection Center 
(“IPC”) is the most vibrant and powerful GSO in filing class actions in 
Taiwan. Numerous cases initiated by the IPC are available on record from its 
professional litigation team.261 The IPC’s operation is funded by the Investor 
Compensation Fund (“ICF”), which is designed to compensate investors if a 
securities or commodities firm is unable to repay due to financial 
difficulties. 262  Donors include exchange companies and certain securities 
companies, some of which are required by the IPA to contribute each month to 
the fund.263  
The Procomp Informatics (“Procomp”) case is one of the most well-known 
ones handled by the IPC. The chairperson and managers embellished the 
company’s financial statements to strengthen its listing application.264 After a 
successful listing, Procomp continued to fabricate and rationalize its financial 
statements by inappropriately allocating company funds, inventing sales 
records, and writing off Procomp’s account receivables.265 After this scandal 
broke out in 2004, 10,038 investors authorized the IPC to file a class action 
lawsuit for civil compensation, with a total claim amount of over NTD $5.5 
 
 259 Class-Action Litigation or Arbitration: Introduction, SEC. & FUTURES INVESTORS PROT. CTR., http:// 
www.sfipc.org.tw/english/service/03-1.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2013).  
 260 Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act, art. 22 (“When a civil dispute occurs between a 
securities investor or a futures trader and an issuer, a securities firm, a securities service enterprise, a futures 
commission merchant, the Stock Exchange, the GreTai Securities Market, a clearing institution or another 
interested party, where the dispute arises out of offerings, issuance, trading, futures transactions, or other 
securities-related matters, the securities investor or futures trader may apply to the protection institution for 
mediation. The protection institution may establish a mediation committee comprising 7 to 15 committee 
members to perform mediation. Regulations governing organization of the committee and mediation 
procedures shall be prescribed by the competent authority.”). 
 261 Winning Class Action Cases- Responsibilities of Board Members and Supervisors, Pamphlets, SEC. & 
FUTURES INVESTORS PROT. CTR., http://www.sfipc.org.tw/english/ad_other_other/index.asp (last visited Sept. 
12, 2013). 
 262 Id. 
 263 Id.; see also Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act, supra note 259, art. 18. 
 264 Shihlin District Court, Chin-No. 3, 2004, available at http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/Index.htm (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2013). 
 265 Id. at 1; Winning Cases: Class-Action Litigation or Arbitration, SEC. & FUTURES INVESTORS PROT. 
CTR.,http://www.sfipc.org.tw/english/service/03-4.asp (last visited May 1, 2014). 
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billion. 266  The IPC even applied for provisional seizure of the Procomp 
shareholders’ two office buildings, worth NTD $20 billion, with no security 
required by the law. 267  Eventually, the court held that Procomp, the 
chairperson, managers, board of directors, and supervisors should compensate 
the investors who suffered losses due to trading Procomp’s stocks from its 
false financial reports from 1999 to 2004.268 
E. Consumer Class Disputes 
Consumer class actions usually do not capture as much attention as mass 
tort cases or securities class disputes. However, small claims filed on a large 
scale can aggregate and turn into a huge case. The major problem for the 
consumer class case is that individuals have no incentives to file separate 
claims when the costs are higher than the potential compensation. Except for 
securities cases that can be litigated by the IPC, consumer class cases often go 
to the CFCT. However, as aforementioned, not every class dispute will be 
handled by the CFCT due to its limited resources. The Alexander Health Club 
Group case was one of the few consumer class actions that have been handled 
by CFCT with support from government agencies. Once the leading Taiwanese 
chain of health clubs, founded in 1982, Alexander Health Club Group abruptly 
announced a suspension of operations in 2007269 due to a precipitous slide in 
annual revenues.270 The news stunned thousands of Alexander Health Club 
members and the public.271 
The day after Alexander’s announcement, the Consumer Protection 
Commission (“CPC”) invited officials and representatives of the Alexander 
Health Club Group,272 as well as relevant agencies and financial institutions—
 
 266 Winning Cases: Class-Action Litigation or Arbitration, supra note 265.  
 267 Securities Investor and Futures Trader Protection Act, supra note 228. art. 34. The provisional seizure 
was later appealed. See Joyce Huang, CTV Appeals over Seizure, TAIPEI TIMES (Nov. 17, 2004), http://www. 
taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2004/11/17/2003211463. 
 268 Winning Class Action Cases- Responsibilities of Board Members and Supervisors, supra note 261. 
 269 The Startling Closure of Alexander Health Clubs, TAIWAN PANORAMA (Jan. 2008), http://www.sino. 
gov.tw/en/show_issue.php?id=2008019701069E.TXT&table=2&cur_page=4&distype=text (last visited Sept. 
12, 2013). 
 270 Alexander Health Club Chain Shuts Down, CHINA POST (Dec. 11, 2007), http://www.chinapost.com. 
tw/news/2007/12/11/134370/Alexander-Health.htm. 
 271 The Startling Closure of Alexander Health Clubs, supra note 269. 
 272 Alexander Health Club Group was absent in the meeting. Agreement Reached on a Temporary Listing 
of Disputed Funds in Billing Related to the Alexander Health Clubs Case, CONSUMER PROT. COMM’N (Dec. 
13, 2007), http://www.cpc.ey.gov.tw/cpc_en/News_Content.aspx?n=F66FD3CFB8AED49D&sms=D5B062E 
5C3E2CFD2&s=9D94DB3CF4735CF0.  
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the Banking Bureau of the Financial Supervisory Commission (“FSC”), the 
Sports Affairs Council, the Ministry of Justice, the Investigation Bureau of the 
Ministry of Justice, the Bankers Association of the Republic of China, credit 
card-issuing banks, and billing banks—to discuss how to protect consumers’ 
rights in Alexander’s abrupt shut-down. 273  Card-issuing banks and billing 
banks agreed to list the membership fees as disputed funds, which meant that 
the consumers were not required to pay.274 Consumers who applied for loans to 
join the Alexander Health Club could also ask for suspension of payment on 
the loans.275 
In response to members’ requests for help to claim the fees they already 
paid, the CFCT filed a class action suit with help from pro bono outside 
counsels, the CPC, and the Taipei city government.276 The litigation is still in 
progress as of this writing.277 
Compared to the consumers from the Alexander Health Club, Dell’s 
customers received comparatively less help in a series of mispricing 
incidents.278 The case was about Dell refusing to honor an online deal due to 
mispricing on its website. Dell sent out an email to all 26,000 of its customers, 
stating that it would only provide a “reasonable discount” for those who still 
liked its products. 279  However, the consumers did not consider that Dell 
proposed the discount in good faith and hence complained to CPC.280 
The CPC invited the CFCT, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and relevant 
government agencies, and academics to discuss the case.281 They concluded 
 
 273 Id.  
 274 Id.  
 275 Id. 
 276 Xiaojihui, Xiaobaohui yu Taibei Shizhengfu Zhengshi Wei “Yalishanda” Shouhaizhe Tichu 
Tuantisusong [CFCT, CPC and Taipei City Government Officially Filed Class Action Lawsuit for Victims of 
Alexander Case], CFCT, http://www.consumers.org.tw/unit412.aspx?id=983 (last visited Sept. 12, 2013). 
 277 Yalishanda Tuantisusong Jindu [The Progress of the Alexander Case], CFCT (July 29, 2010), http:// 
www.consumers.org.tw/unit211.aspx?id=199; Lushi:Tuantisusong Jiao Youli [The Lawyer Asserts that Group 
Litigations Are Favorable], UDN (Sept. 5, 2013), http://udn.com/NEWS/SOCIETY/SOC6/8144210.shtml. The 
case is still currently in the first instance in Taipei District Court. Id.  
 278 Jose Vilches, Dell Accidentally Sells 19-Inch Monitors for $15 in Taiwan, TECHSPOT (July 1, 2009), 
http://www.techspot.com/news/35297-dell-accidentally-sells-19-inch-monitors-for-15-in-taiwan.html. Dell 
Taiwan posted a NTD $4800 19-inch LCD monitor for NTD $500. Id. Before Dell corrected the price, more 
than 26,000 people had ordered 140,000 monitors over eight hours. Id. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. Daier Cuobiaojiage Yinfa Baogou Shihjian [Dell Mispriced Incidents Causes Rush Buy], Executive 
Yuan, July 2, 2009, http://www.ey.gov.tw/News_Content4.aspx?n=E7E343F6009EC241&sms=E452EBB48F 
CCFD71&s=A9643F4822B1D1D6. 
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that pursuant to the CPA,282 Dell should be responsible for these online orders. 
Therefore, the CPC demanded that Dell honor the mispriced products in a 
specified proportionate method283 and also suggested that the CFCT provide 
legal assistance to the consumers who purchased Dell products.284 Dell did not 
follow the CPC’s advice; instead, it only offered coupons for consumers to 
purchase the products on its official website.285 Dell’s mispricing snafu did not 
end there. Only three days after the notice on its official website about offering 
coupons for the mispriced products, another pricing error occurred.286  The 
Taipei City Government demanded that Dell should make improvements 
regarding this serious error, according to the CPA.287 
Instead of filing class actions on behalf of consumers as in the Alexander 
case, here the CFCT only offered a template of the complaint pleading 
available on its website, free for customers to use, but did not represent the 
consumers. 288  Several lawsuits by consumers were initiated. 289  However, 
among the thirteen cases so far being decided and available on record, only 
 
 282 Id. “Business operators shall ensure the accuracy of the contents of advertisements and their 
obligations to consumers shall not be less than what is stated in the advertisements.” Consumer Protection 
Law, supra note 228, art. 22. 
 283 Su Wenbin, Xiaobaohui: Daier Meibi Dingdan Yingyi Biaojia Chuhuo yi Tai [CPC: Dell Should 
Honor One Item per Order], ITHOME (June 30, 2009), http://www.ithome.com.tw/itadm/article.php?c=55759 
(CPC’s proposal was that the price should be adjusted according to the order sequence, e.g., the first order is 
eligible for the most discounted price and the last order should follow the original list price.). 
 284 Daier Cuobiaojiage Yinfa Baogou Shihjian [Dell Mispriced Incidents Causes Rush Buy], EXECUTIVE 
YUAN, July 2, 2009, http://www.ey.gov.tw/News_Content4.aspx?n=E7E343F6009EC241&sms=E452EBB48 
FCCFD71&s=A9643F4822B1D1D6. 
 285 Daier Gongsi Shengminggao [Annoucement from Dell Corp.], DELL (July 3, 2009), 
http://www.ap.dell.com/content/topics/topic.aspx/ap/topics/popup/zhtw/online_statement?c=tw&l=zh&cs=twd
hs1 (NTD $1000 coupon for the monitors and NTD $3000 coupons for the laptops). 
 286 Michele Masterson, Dell’s Double Doh! Mispriced Products Online—Again, CRN (June 6, 2009), 
http://www.crn.com/news/components-peripherals/218400506/dells-double-doh-mispriced-products-online-
again.htm (Dell’s Latitude E4300 laptop that normally costs NTD $60,900 displayed a slashed price of NTD 
$18,500 for eight hours, netting orders for over 40,000 devices.). 
 287 See Hu Hua Tai, Xiaofei Ding Xing Hua qi yue Tiao Kuan zhi Hang Zheng Gui Zhi [The 
Administrative Approach for Consumer Form Contracts], 17 XIAOFEIZHE BAOHU YANJIU [Consumer 
Protection Research] 97, supra note 72, available at http://www.cpc.ey.gov.tw/Upload/RelFile/1651/701854/ 
bd660906-8f9f-46e1-9a29-60c7acfe089d.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2013). 
 288 Mei Shang Daier Gufen Youxiangongsi Xiaofeizhe Qing Zhu Yi [A Notice to Consumers Who 
Purchased Dell’s Products], CONSUMER’S FOUND., CHINESE TAIPEI, http://www.consumers.org.tw/unit211. 
aspx?id=161 (last visited Sept. 12, 2013); Mei Shang Daier Gufen Youxiangongsi Xiaofeizhe Qing Zhu Yi (Di 
er Bo) [A Notice to Consumers Who Purchased Dell’s Products (Second Notice)], CONSUMER’S FOUND., 
CHINESE TAIPEI, http://www.consumers.org.tw/unit211.aspx?id=162 (last visited May 1, 2014). 
 289 Law and Regulation Retrieving System, JUDICIAL YUAN OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, http://jirs. 
judicial.gov.tw/Index.htm (last visited May 1, 2014). 
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two have ruled in favor of the consumers, due to the controversies over 
whether the purchase order was a contract.290 
F. Conclusions: Taiwan 
Although normative laws regarding class action mechanisms have been 
carefully devised in Taiwan, there have been few class action cases on record, 
except for the IPC cases. The major reason is the lack of incentives. First, 
attorney-fee arrangements are generally restricted by bar associations in 
Taiwan,291 which offers little incentive to handle large cases such as class 
actions. Second, the opt-in mechanism requires consent or authorization from 
claimants, resulting in a low aggregation and petty claim size, unless it is a 
mass tort claim that involves more substantial stakes.292 Another factor limiting 
class actions is the compensation amount. Compensation in Taiwan is modest, 
because its legal system does not apply punitive damages unless specified by 
law. In civil cases, compensation is the major goal rather than deterrence. Even 
if punitive damage is stipulated by law, the amount of damages awarded is 
generally capped at two or three times the amount of actual damages.293 The 
overall design of the legal system does not provide private parties, such as 
lawyers, a chip in class disputes. 
Where private parties and lawyers are given few incentives to file class 
actions, the involvement of GSOs becomes critical in the implementation of 
Taiwanese class actions. By creating special procedural rights attributed to the 
groups by the legislature, GSOs, having specific “standing to sue,” give 
scholars and judges the comfort of a familiar, conceptualized approach.294 The 
 
 290 Id.  
 291 E.g. Taipei Bar Association, Taipei Lu Shi Gong Hui Zhang Cheng [The Charter of Taipei Bar 
Association], art. 29. Take Taipei Bar Association for example: Even though contingency fee arrangements are 
allowed in most civil cases, according to the Taipei Bar Association Professional Legal Ethics [Lu Shi Luen Li 
Gui Fan], the Taipei Bar Association capped the total fees that attorneys can charge per case, which 
substantially limits the revenue of attorneys who represent class actions. Id. For example, for a claimed amount 
under NTD $5 million, attorney fees may not exceed NTD $500,000; for an amount over NTD $5 million, the 
article suggests that attorneys increase the fees by no more than three percent of the claimed amount.  
 292 Michael Palmer & Chao Xi, China, The Globalization of Class Actions, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 270–79 (2009). 
 293 For example, art. 51 of the CPA states: “In a litigation brought in accordance with this law, the 
required consumer may claim for punitive damages up to 3 times the amount of actual damages as a result of 
injuries caused by the willful act of misconduct of business operators; however, if such injuries are caused by 
negligence, a punitive damage up to one time the amount of the actual damages may be claimed.” Consumer 
Protection Law, supra note 228, art. 51. 
 294 Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil—A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 334, 
348 (2003). 
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establishment of the IPC offers the best example of devising standing in the 
field of securities law. The IPC was established with the goal of utilizing 
securities class actions, and hence the overall design is to confer it with the 
power and funds to systematically process these types of cases.295 By filing 
class actions on behalf of diffuse investors, the IPC claims compensation for 
investors and corrects wrongdoings in the securities market, contributing to a 
sound securities market and the stability of the financial environment. 
However, besides securities law, the class action mechanism is too little 
utilized to safeguard people’s rights in other legal areas. Even though most 
GSOs have been relied on in the legal areas where society desires certain 
issues to be addressed, such as investor protection or consumer protection, 
most of them were originally established for charitable purposes rather than 
litigation,296 and hence are not equipped with adequate resources to handle 
class actions. This is obvious in that CFCT can only focus on certain 
benchmark mass tort cases and barely has resources for consumer class 
actions. The LAF is another example of a charitable organization turning into a 
class action initiator. As it is sufficiently funded by the Judicial Yuan, with its 
own staff attorneys and in-house lawyers, the LAF has a comparative 
advantage over CFCT and has been able to participate in some huge class 
action cases requiring more resources. 
Both the CFCT and LAF are close to “catch-all” organizations and have 
begun dealing with class actions due to social expectations whenever the 
potential claimants have nowhere else to seek help or legal assistance. Neither 
of them was originally designed to process class claims. Therefore, assistance 
from government agencies in handling class actions is critical. However, if the 
operation of the class action mechanisms is still to some extent contingent 
upon the government’s involvement, it is not purely a sound private law 
mechanism. The lack of incentives and limited capabilities of class action 
initiators also explain the low utilization of class action mechanisms in 
Taiwan. 
 
 295 Tuanti susong anjian huizongbiao [Class Action Cases Summary Charts], SFIPC, http://www.sfipc. 
org.tw/main.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). As of January 2014, there have been seventy-five cases 
successfully filed by the IPC. It has represented 83,345 investors and has claimed NTD $34,159,293,000 for 
the investors. Id. 
 296 About Consumer’s Foundation, Chinese Taipei, supra note 241.  
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III.  CHINA AND TAIWAN 
Legal systems evolve in tandem with the development of societies as 
prevailing trends and cultural heritage shape the features of the laws.297 By 
analyzing representative cases, this Article intends to analyze how the legal 
systems and beyond in these two jurisdictions address class disputes, with 
implications behind practice. To explore this topic, this Section examines the 
messages that lie in the differences between the two legal systems from 
cultural and historical perspectives. 
Historically, law in China is “first and foremost a political tool, operating 
in a vertical direction, with its primary concern being state interests, rather than 
on a horizontal plane between individuals.”298 The fundamental features of the 
laws in traditional China are political, administrative, and secondary.299 The 
Chinese legal tradition exhibits a lack of the “notion of private ordering by 
law.” 300  Confucianism and legalism both focus on “determining and 
maintaining a desired social order.”301 
Modern legal reform, started by the Qing Dynasty and continued by the 
Nationalist government, brought in new systems to replace the traditional 
institutions and structures that had existed for centuries.302 Confucianism and 
all other legal traditions may have faded for a period of time after May 4, 1919, 
and the traditional conceptions of law may not have the strong influence they 
used to have. 303  However, they have not totally disappeared with the 
breakdown of the traditional institutions and structures, but have continued to 
have an effect on the contemporary development of law in another form.304 
Legal developments in post-Mao China have moved away from the domination 
of Soviet law. 305  Lawmakers in China have been searching for ideas and 
models from Western countries and adjacent East Asian countries since the 
1990s.306 Due to the lack of the legislative history on record, there has been 
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little direct evidence about which legal systems have served as models. 
However, incidental evidence, such as Chinese scholarly works and the 
structure of the provisions in the laws, gives clues that lead to the conclusion 
that modern Chinese law has mostly assimilated civil law tradition. For 
example, the structures of the provisions of the General Principle of Civil Law 
closely follow the German model.307 Additionally, the use of mass legislation 
rather than case trials to build up the Chinese legal system quickly also reflects 
features of civil law tradition, which places more emphasis on statutes than on 
cases. It is reasonable to categorize China as a civil law country. 
On the other hand, Taiwan’s legal tradition has been a more complicated 
mixture. Due to its colonial history in the late 19th and early 20th century, 
Taiwan has been influenced by the Chinese, Japanese, and westernized 
Japanese legal traditions.308 Being a “frontier settler society with a traditional 
Chinese legacy,”309  Taiwan was exposed to Western law as selected by a 
colonial government, Japan.310 With its experience of the Meiji legal reforms, 
Japan began to “modernize” the laws in Taiwanese society.311 After the 1920s, 
westernized Japanese civil substantive and procedural laws were applied to 
Taiwanese cases.312 Western law was introduced to Taiwan through mainland 
Japanese laws, which were modeled after Western laws. 313  Hence, these 
reforms reduced the influence of Western colonial law and Chinese imperial 
law on Taiwan’s legal system and made Japanese mainland law the dominant 
law of colonial Taiwan.314 
Scholars have concluded that the Taiwanese gradually learned to use 
Western-style laws and judicial systems to replace traditional-style mediation 
via government promotion, urbanization, and colonial modern education.315 
The Japanese legal reform was maintained by the incoming Republic of China 
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(ROC) regime after the war and when the Japanese left Taiwan in 1945.316 The 
change of political authority did not interrupt Taiwan’s reception of Western 
laws, and the ROC codes were also modeled according to the Japanese 
codes.317  However, because this legal reform was selected by the colonial 
government, the Taiwanese people have not yet generally known “the 
fundamental spirit” of modern Western law.318 
A. The Origin and Evolution of the Civil Law Tradition 
Nourished with these cultures and histories, both China and Taiwan have 
assimilated the civil law tradition. The civil law tradition has influenced how 
these jurisdictions apply class action mechanisms in several respects. The first 
is the rigorous application of the opt-in procedure. In the civil law tradition, 
“the law is applied through abstractions” by using legal principles and concepts 
to apply the law to the facts.319 The reason for the law being applied through 
general principles is closely related to the emergence of European universities 
in the late 11th and 12th centuries, which contributed to the formation of 
modern Western legal systems. 320  The law was taught as “a distinct and 
systematized body of knowledge, a science,” in which knowledge was studied 
and explained in terms of “general principles and truths basic to the system as 
a whole.”321 This type of legal science training has been applied by successive 
generations of university graduates who later served in all types of legal 
professions, such as counselors, judges, advocates, administrators, or 
legislative draftsmen.322 They gave structure and coherence to legal norms, 
which contributed to formation of new legal systems.323 
One such abstraction is the concept of “subjective right,” which may be 
defined as “a right that belongs to someone.”324 This type of right is twofold: 
one is substantive, such as contract rights or property rights; and the other is 
procedural, which is closer to the concept of “standing to sue” or “party in 
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interest.”325 When a plaintiff wants to file a claim asserting his or her rights in 
most civil law countries, he or she must demonstrate that he or she legitimately 
holds both rights.326 However, in certain situations, these two rights might be 
separate and held by different individuals or entities.327 In such cases, the 
individuals or entities would need to demonstrate the reason for, and the 
authorization of, a procedural right according to agreements or laws.328 Such a 
rigid application of laws is due to civil legal systems operating through 
statutes. Civil law procedure is a formalistic system with elaborate, detailed 
written rules and limited room for judicial discretion.329 Court decisions must 
strictly conform to written rules, while policy and other considerations are left 
to the legislature.330 
Such features in the civil law tradition make it difficult to transplant class 
action mechanisms with an Anglo-American legacy that contradicts the spirit 
of civil law, such as the relaxation of the obligation to acquire procedural 
rights via the opt-out design. Due to the stated concerns, most of the civil law 
countries tend to avoid controversies and adopt the opt-in design in class 
actions by requiring every potential plaintiff to join the class action through 
affirmative conduct. This shows that civil law countries still feel 
uncomfortable about binding parties without clear authorization. Compared to 
the default inclusion in the opt-out design, the opt-in design curtails the power 
of the class actions in aggregating claims. Hence, the sizes of the claims are 
usually substantially smaller than those of the claims under the opt-out design. 
In addition to the civil law legacy and surrounding mechanisms that shaped 
the normative rules, some factors other than legal tradition also contributed to 
the actual practice. As for China, although it has adopted class action 
mechanisms through statutory laws, the actual implementation is still 
contingent upon the government’s attitude toward cases. For mass tort class 
actions, there is no room for lawyers when the case is too sensitive, because 
the government does not like lawyers to intervene in its control of incidents. 
This phenomenon is especially obvious in mass tort cases, since this type of 
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case usually involves huge public interest. Moreover, consumer class actions 
on a large scale are not welcomed if the actions alert the government’s radar. 
These observations imply that the Chinese class action mechanism is actually 
not for the Chinese people to seek their rights, but an administrative tool to 
settle potential social disorders via judicial institutions. 
The class action mechanism in Taiwan is a novel attempt. Due to the lack 
of incentives, the class action mechanisms have been little utilized by private 
parties. Devising the GSOs to bring class action lawsuits has been the choice 
of the Taiwanese legislature, which to some extent shows the preference for 
institutions with a public legal figure to deal with cases involving public 
interest. However, most GSOs are not equipped with sufficient resources, 
which still results in selective justice, depending on government involvement. 
Interestingly, although China and Taiwan have different types of legal systems 
and distinct political systems, the key factors for succeeding in class disputes 
in both countries lie in whether these cases have been supported, or to some 
extent backed, by the government or government-related institutions. 
B. Private Law versus Public Law 
Another observation that can be drawn is that the evolution and 
implementation of class action mechanisms seem to have blurred the boundary 
between public and private law. Haley defined both public and private law 
enforcement as follows: 331  Public law enforcement is the process of 
“prosecutorial discretion and control” by those who exercise political authority 
and power, as well as their agents,332 and cannot be ended only by parties’ 
withdrawing the complaint or reaching a settlement with the offender. 333 
Private law enforcement is the process of enforcing legal rules via empowering 
private parties, which indicates that rulers “give up control” or recognize “their 
inability to control.”334 
Although civil law systems have been known as inquisitorial, the role of 
civil courts seems to be far more limited and not as active and powerful as that 
of U.S. courts with respect to class actions. However, in some situations, the 
court needs to decide whether there is a “common interest” in order to issue a 
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public notice for other potential plaintiffs to join the class action. To some 
extent, this influences the initiation of private enforcement. Furthermore, in 
some legal systems as aforementioned, only qualified organizations (e.g., 
GSOs) can bring class actions, essentially holding the prosecutorial discretion 
and control over the initiation of class actions. The Chinese and Taiwanese 
class action mechanisms rely considerably on certain institutions with a public 
legal figure, which suggests the incorporation of public characteristics into 
private law adjudication. 
Even for the US, which is well-known for its class actions and advocacy 
characteristics in private law enforcement, the intervention in the proceedings 
by an adjudicator (judge) in class actions also diminishes the strength of 
private law enforcement. If we consider the court to be the politically and 
legally authorized state actor or its agent, its authority to certify the class 
indicates its control over the initiation of a class action. Additionally, judicial 
review of settlements by the courts also means that the parties can no longer 
simply end the process by withdrawing their complaint or reaching a 
settlement with one another. 
All these features of different class action mechanisms imply the same 
thing: Class action mechanisms carry the features of both private and public 
law enforcement and no longer stay in the pure private law regime. The 
practice of class action mechanisms eventually moves from one end of the 
spectrum, where the private law regime settles, to somewhere in between the 
private and public law regimes. 
CONCLUSION 
Class action mechanisms in China and Taiwan are still in the 
developmental stage. Even though there have been hurdles for countries with 
civil law traditions to adopt class action mechanisms that were originally 
foreign to them, they seem to have found ways to assimilate these mechanisms 
into their legal systems, such as by creating GSOs as the initiators of class 
actions and incorporating government involvement. Creative implementation 
by these two jurisdictions suggests other possibilities of addressing class 
disputes. By analyzing different approaches to handling mass tort cases, it is 
hoped that this Article will evoke an exchange of ideas and inspire diverse 
thinking beyond the boundaries of the different legal systems. 
 
